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West Europe Report

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21 December 1984

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SOCIALIST LEFT MP EXPLAINS PARTY'S ARMS CONTROL STAND

Oslo NY TID in Norwegian 20 Oct 84 p 15

/Interview with MP Stein Ornhoi: "'Against All the Others' in Defense Policy"/

/Text/ "In Norwegian politics there is still a basic difference with respect to defense and security policy between the Socialist Left Party /SV/ and the other parties. The security-policy conflict in Norwegian politics is real because basic problems remain unsolved," MP Stein Ornhoi told NY TID.

"The fact is that the peace movement--although somewhat weakened outside of Parliament after the deployment of new nuclear missiles--has had a long-term effect on the established system," said Ornhoi.

"The peace issue has indeed been strengthened in Parliament because the peace movement has raised a number of real problems that remain unsolved.

Again and Again

"The question of nuclear arms reduction will surface again and again both in and out of Parliament--in a variety of situations. Peace will remain the top-priority item for SV members in Parliament. It will be just as important in the future as it has been in the past. There will perhaps be somewhat less media attention--unfortunately."

/Question/ In spite of the peace movement--new nuclear missiles are being deployed daily in the East and the West; is there not a danger that most people "will give up" when nothing seems to be of any use?

/Answer/ Let me put it this way: Many will no doubt lose some hope. But remember, they are not changing their minds. Nobody who understands what the use of nuclear arms implies--and has taken a stand against it--changes his mind. The central point here is that public attitude has changed. Politicians must take this into consideration and this is a reality that cannot be changed by the fact that Labor Party politicians now seem to be busily engaged putting a lid on the security-policy debate.

Big Differences

/Question/ Lid on the debate? Aren't SV and the Labor Party /Ap/ taking largely the same position now on arms reduction? What is the difference?

/Answer/ The difference between SV and Ap lies exactly in their position on these issues. The Labor Party has been influenced by the peace movement. It has also changed its mind about the 572 nuclear missiles, which is good, but there are still about 25,000 nuclear warheads within the NATO system and Ap's attitude toward these is shocking and mistaken.

/Question/ Not many Ap members would accept this charge considering the party's new reduction-of-arms platform.

/Answer/ The Labor Party's proposals, together with those of the Conservative Party, regarding these issues are sufficiently nuclear and nonbinding that they will not relieve the public's uneasiness about an ongoing nuclear arms buildup.

SV Alone

/Question/ But SV cannot deny that Ap has made important policy changes in this area?

/Answer/ Ap has changed its stand somewhat. Some would like to view this change as basic and decisive. Thereby, they refuse to admit that Ap and the Conservative Party /H/ are in agreement on most of the important points in Norway's defense and security policy.

Nevertheless, there is one important difference between H and Ap. This difference concerns attitude rather than position. Ap shows greater openness towards a changing world. Ap is moving in the right direction, but slowly.

/Question/ What might be concluded from what you are saying is that SV still stands alone on defense and security-policy matters in Parliament?

/Answer/ SV differs with the other political parties in Norway on the issue of defense and security policy. Not even the Liberal Party is capable of freeing itself from the past in this area," said Ornhøi.

8952

CSO: 3639/23

COUNTY LABOR PARTY ORGANIZATION URGES RENEWED ARMS DEBATE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Oct 84 p 3

/Article by Bjorn Talen: "Nuclear Arms Debate Erupting Again in Labor Party?"

/Text/ Another nuclear debate is brewing in the Labor Party. Strong efforts are under way in Akershus County Labor Party to change the nuclear policy plant in the party's platform draft. This could result in a platform firmly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in defense of Norway.

The Akershus party organization hosted a broadly based security-policy conference last Saturday and Sunday, during which various party groups submitted proposed changes in the new party platform. One of the proposals suggested closer cooperation on all levels with Eastern Europe in order to promote greater trust and reduce tension. But the new nuclear policy proposals are bound to create renewed debate. The radical as well as the "moderate" proposals sharpen the Labor Party's stand on this issue.

Both positions are based on the premise that conventional forces are now balanced East and West. Therefore, one party group, under the leadership of Jostein Nyhamar, maintains that Norway should declare "it will not accept nuclear weapons in times of peace or war and will not permit the use of nuclear weapons in defense of Norway." Another party group, led by Anders Hellebust, wants the following formulation, which corresponds to a resolution recently passed by the Social Democratic Party in Denmark: "The Labor Party will actively work to keep Norway nuclear-free in times of peace, crisis or war."

"The first proposal will not serve the process and could be disadvantageous in negotiations with the Soviet Union," Anders Hellebust told AFTENPOSTEN. Hellebust is chairman of the County Party's Security Policy Committee.

Jostein Nyhamar, one of the conference chairmen, said he was very pleased with the ideas submitted by Reiulf Steen in Saturday's interview with AFTENPOSTEN. He maintained that the Labor Party's platform draft already conflicts with NATO's nuclear strategy and that the proposed radical changes would not mean a break with NATO. But he also felt that NATO has developed a clear offensive strategy and would support a review of individual alliance members' doctrines and strategies designed to stress NATO's defensive aims.

The county party's security policy committee is scheduled to meet with the Labor Party's international committee next Tuesday to submit the ideas developed during the conference. AFTENPOSTEN was told that if the Oslo County Labor Party supports the Akershus organization it would certain mean that the national party congress will endorse the proposed changes.

8952

CSO: 3639/23

LABOR, YOUTH, POLITICAL GROUPS BACK FREEZE PROPOSAL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Nov 84 p 56

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Request for Nuclear Freeze Supported by 600 Organizations"]

[Text] Some 600 organizations support the request by "No to Nuclear Weapons" that Norway vote for a nuclear freeze at the UN next month. These organizations range from the League of Norwegian Counties to the Grong Parish Council. More than a million and a half people now support the request to freeze nuclear arsenals in the East and the West.

"Regrettably, Norway abstained from voting on this issue the last time it came up in the UN," Ole Kopreitan, the daily leader of "No to Nuclear Weapons" told AFTENPOSTEN. His organization now wants to meet with all the parties in Parliament to discuss the nuclear freeze.

The names of the 600 organizations will be announced next week in a full-page ad in DAGBLADET. They have signed a request that Parliament decide this fall whether Norway will support the freeze proposal submitted to the UN by Mexico and Sweden. The aim of the proposal is to stop testing, production and deployment of nuclear arms.

Furthermore, the same organizations are asking Parliament to adopt a resolution to the effect that nuclear weapons will not be allowed in Norway. "Such weapons shall not be part of Norway's defense. Other nations shall not be allowed to bring them into Norway. We are asking the Government to take an active part in the UN, NATO and other international organizations to achieve an end to all testing, production and deployment of nuclear arms as a first step in the reduction of nuclear arms both in the East and the West," according to the call of "No to Nuclear Weapons."

"There is little likelihood of any new splits on the missile issue in Parliament this fall. The Labor Party will not vote for the Socialist Left Party's (SV) proposal later this month.

"What the Labor Party decides may also be contingent upon tactical political considerations. We, however, feel it is politically right to submit the freeze request. This request is actually overdue," said Kopreitan.

Among the organizations that support the request of "No to Nuclear Weapons" are: the Norwegian Chemical Workers' Union, the Norwegian Transport Workers' Union, the National Association of Schools, Christian People's Party Youth, the National Association of Center Party Youth, the Liberal Party, Liberal Party Youth, the Socialist Left Party, the Norwegian Communist Party, the Norwegian Environmental Protection Association and the Norwegian Christian Youth Association.

8952

CSO: 3639/27

BRIEFS

ANTI-NATO PLANK REJECTED--"We welcome all support, but remember the motto. We do not endorse the slogan 'Norway out of NATO,' which will appear in tomorrow evening's demonstration march," Magne Barth, a spokesman for "No to Nuclear Weapons," told ARBEIDERBLADET. "The reason is that some who call themselves the Labor Force Group are urging people through placards to join in the march--under the slogan 'Norway out of NATO,' among other things. Other slogans of the so-called Labor Force Group are 'Work, not Bombs' and 'No Illusions in the UN.' The torchlight parade is a crosspolitical effort and, therefore, we cannot endorse slogans designed by organizations and groups without any regard for the fundamental motto," said Barth. /Text/ /Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Oct 84 p 8/ 8952

CSO: 3639/23

SOLUTIONS TO IMMIGRANT, REFUGEE PROBLEM EXAMINED

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Autumn 84 pp 279-288

[Article by Patrick Bachellerie, special adviser to the president of the Bous-sac Saint Freres Company since March 1982; professor at the HEC [Advanced Commercial Studies] from 1978 to 1981; for several years, France's official for foreign relations on the Intergovernmental Committee for Migrations: former technical adviser on the staff of the mediator, then of the secretary of state to the minister of labor: "Immigrants and Refugees: The Responsibility of the West"]

[Text] Since 1973, the migratory trend has shifted. The West, and Old Europe in particular, has taken in fewer and fewer refugees and no more immigrant workers at all. On the contrary, the return of the latter to their native countries is accelerating. In 1984, this trend mainly concerns over 10 million refugees placed under the mandate of the High Commission on Refugees and 6 million immigrant workers living in a Europe that increasingly distrusts them.

Caught between the verbal excesses of xenophobic flunkies and the inimitable dialectic of intergovernmental humanitarian organizations, the subject is rarely dealt with on the basis of precise facts. Fiction and its cortege of hasty commentaries always win out.

If one excepts the population movements resulting from natural cataclysms, the refugees and economic migrants must not be the silent waste of bad decisions or the negligence of nations.

What then is the real story if one tries to place man above the necessary diplomatic games and to bring ideological preconditions back within the confines of good sense?

Immigrant Workers: Temptations of the Ebb

Since time eternal, there have always been very large migratory population movements stemming from economic causes. When generations find relative well-being, they put down roots. Otherwise, the transhumance resumes. Around the year 1900, Europe reached a population peak of some 400 million inhabitants, which in 1955 began a decline with a balance of 300 million. At the same time, people abandoned rural areas for the cities. North America's population went from 81 to 183 million as the result of a veritable wave that sent over 65 million Europeans to the New World from 1865 to 1934.

During the years of economic recovery of the postwar period, Europe once again took in migrants looking for work. In 1970, 8 percent of its population was foreign in origin. This incessant mixing of the population, based on the needs of nations and the men constituting them, is a fundamental element. Sedentariness is a provisional fact. Examples of massive movements of inter-continental or international populations for economic reasons are a dominant factor of contemporary geopolitics. Previously, there were no migration problems. They existed, were part of the nature of things or took on the look of wars with their accompanying occupiers-occupied. This is a new factor of the 20th century. It is the consequence of the population explosion, the stability of the host countries, the effective and omnipresent organization of states, increased possibilities of transportation, the fragility and moving needs of performing economies, the individual egotisms that result from them, and so on.

Governments

The situation of the economic migrants in 1984 must therefore be put back into this historic context. The economic crisis in the West slows down the migratory phenomena, but this is but a matter of limited, controlled manifestations. The situation is naturally difficult, but the fear it rouses is disproportionate.

Now then, to intervene too heavy-handedly in the natural interplay of migrations is suicidal myopia. Too much rigidity provides short-term comfort and an eventual break. "I do not want to worsen unemployment in France by leaving the door open to immigrant workers," said the French secretary of state on 20 and 21 March 1984. In Washington, the House of Representatives granted amnesty on Tuesday, 15 June 1984, to a large majority of illegal immigrants in order better to drive back new waves of illegal aliens. Helmut Kohl's Germany, in 1984 alone, has managed to push out over 200,000 Turkish workers with their families.

The spectacular side of these exemplary measures naturally must not hide the more intricate and constructive measures taken in behalf of migration and out of sight of the voters.

The instructions addressed to commissioners of the republic by former Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy on 1 March 1984 bear witness to this. The fact nevertheless remains that the election deadlines for political personnel and the regulatory mania of the administrations conceal the inevitable evolution toward coexistence of immigrant and national workers.

Unavoidable Facts

In order to see this structural evolution clearly, one has to assimilate two constant factors: one of technical-economic origin and the other of psycho-sociological origin. In France, by way of example (the trends are the same in other Western countries), over 2 million foreign workers contribute to economic development. They occupy unskilled jobs (86 percent are blue-collar workers) whose difficult working conditions are rejected by the French (44 percent in construction, 37.1 percent in health care, 25 percent in the automobile

industry). Unemployment has increased 4.5 times since 1974, even though immigration was halted. The correlation between the number of unemployed and immigration is therefore artificial. Furthermore, the social cost of immigrant workers is lower than that of French wage earners (health insurance, family allowances, retirement), contrary to preconceived notions.

On the psycho-sociological level, things are more difficult to understand. This is the field in which prejudice is the most noticeable. Behind the effective sight of border control, the repression of illegal movements, encouragement to return home, the structural factor developing remains the irreversible integration of different ethnic groups and varied cultures in the urban milieus of Europe. There is first of all a comparison of the conduct of immigrant workers with that of the nationals. It is due to the effects of industrial reorganizations, the improvement in the level of professional skills of immigrants, their reduced flexibility and mobility (changes in assignments, enterprises, regions). Less and less marginal or illegal as the years go by, their stability in the sociological fabric of the countries involved pushes them to try to take legitimate advantage (based on the work done, the deductions for benefits and tax pressure placed upon them) of the possibilities offered by mixed marriages and naturalization. Clearly -- ruling out a massive rejection at the borders, which is totally unlikely given the disproportionate consequences it would have on the international level -- the West must honor its initial hospitality, even if its economic errors push it to do the contrary. Let one not say in addition that this coexistence is paid for by a lack of security for nationals. Provided that one reads them, statistics show for crimes subject to the Assize Court, a lower rate for immigrants and a rate equal to that of nationals for petty crime (at least in France).

Moreover, this coexistence does not merely entail the limitations of living together. It also includes vitality. Confronted with structures weighed down by history and given a collapsing demography, the immigrants (especially those of the second generation) are becoming one of the spearheads of the evolution in the way of life in Western countries. This is an obvious fact uncovered by the most enlightened observers. For example, at the time of the fashion shows in Paris in March 1984, creator Jean-Paul Gaultier (without a doubt the best liked by the 1,300 French and international reporters present) oriented his entire collection toward the "beurs" garments. The importance of fashion trends as a privileged sign of the evolution in ways of life gives the event, limited in appearance, all its significance. The same observation can be made about the musical programming on local radio stations in the big cities (over 25 percent of the audience in two years of existence). Rhythms from the native countries of the immigrants are now "in."

Emigration of Immigrants

It nevertheless remains legitimate for the West to retain its identity and for immigrants to affirm their presence with intelligence and moderation. It is necessary for moderate strategies to be followed with determination wherever there are excesses. Given a complex social fabric, it is useful to proceed by successive changes in the balance between immigrants and nationals. In this connection, the measures taken by several European countries to solve these questions are interesting.

They concern the normalization of the situation of the illegals, the simplification of residence or working papers for "regulars," limitations placed on the introduction of seasonal foreign labor, the fight against trafficking in such workers, efforts in the area of introductory or professional training, improved living conditions, keeping families together and, naturally, their return to the native country. On this point and with respect to principles, intentions expressed are favorable to immigrant workers deprived of their regular jobs for a time and willing to leave. They receive financial aid from the governments and the enterprises that get rid of them. These sums vary between 50,000 and 150,000 francs.

Nevertheless, the good conscience of which the West may boast in announcing these measures is limited in fact. The case of the Turks working in Germany is a good example. Living in the FRG for 20 years, they are neither Turks nor German when they return home. Furthermore, in Germany they are called the "Gastarbeiter" and in Turkey, the "Almanci." Leaving voluntarily but finally pushed out by the rising racism and shrewd pressure of the businesses, there will be over 200,000 of them (with their families) returning to Ankara in 1984. There, "deimmunized" by the comforts of Germany, they will once again have to get used to the way of life of their country. They confront mores and customs that are restrictive and that have been largely forgotten.

These Turks who immigrated to Germany and who emigrate to Turkey try to set up small businesses, their only real possibility. But it is a bitter struggle and the pitfalls many. The failure often comes at the end of the trip, with Germany marks having melted away at the whim of local predators. The return home is calvary in reverse for most of them. The same is true of the Algerians returning to the Oran region, the Senegalese going to the villages of the Dakar back country.

The West must exercise foresight and assume the consequences of its decisions, however inevitable and necessary they may seem. One must avoid "the absurd, simplistic illusion, outwardly attractive, but sinister and basically destructive..." (speech by Mrs Georgina Dufoix before the National Assembly on 25 May 1984). Otherwise, race riots are to be predicted, as during the Black Power period in the United States. Moreover, one can consider them as inevitable, a kind of necessary crisis in the sociological morphogenesis underway.

Saga of the Refugees

If Western opinion adopts a rather cool attitude toward its immigrant workers, it manifests growing disinterest in the problem of the refugees. Whether political refugees, dissidents, stateless persons, and so on, the situation grows increasingly confused. The word "refugee," whose definition remains vague, gives rise to a veritable linguistic arborescence. One now has "refugees in orbit." The phrase is the rage in Geneva. These are refugees under the mandate of the High Commission on Refugees whom no one wants and whose provisional host countries throw the ball back and forth. Having said that much, unlike the case of the immigrant workers whose problem is encountered on the spot, the vast majority of the refugees appear to be a distant reality. Even if that reality is the result of Manichean ideological struggles in which the West is widely involved. After the napalm, the bandaid. For the refugees under

the mandate of the High Commission on Refugees alone, the figures are impressive. Over 10 million refugees in 1984, including 168,000 in Thailand, 99,200 in Malaysia, 700,000 in the Sudan, 159,000 in Tanzania, 214,000 in Burundi, 89,000 in Zambia, 116,000 in Uganda, 96,200 in Angola, 301,200 in Zaire, 1 million in the United States, 353,000 in Canada, 70,000 in Guatemala, 317,000 in Australia, 1.6 million in Iran and 2.8 million in Pakistan. This is a population greater than that of a city such as Paris, combining all its districts and suburbs, that must be artificially supported every day of the year.

Situation Bordering on the Absurd

These concentrations of refugees handled by the international community pose a problem that is increasingly difficult to solve, but simple to pose. On the one hand, the humanitarian mechanism comes into full play. On the other, the traditional host countries (the United States, Germany, France, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Australia, and so on) are increasingly limiting -- except for occasional spectacular gestures -- their admission quotas for refugees.

Everywhere in the world where there are geopolitical conflicts, persistent abscesses therefore emerge in the form of refugee camps. In a "normal" situation, these camps should be but transit camps. They are overpopulated with men and women cut off from their native surroundings and often unwanted. However, with the final destination countries taking in few or none at all, we now reach a dangerous and remarkable impasse of the international political scene that no one truly wants to look at!

What is to be done, for example, with the 3 million Afghan refugees living in the camps under the mandate of the High Commission on Refugees on the Pakistani-Afghan border? Who will give visas to the thousands of Vietnamese boat people piled together on the island prison of Heilingchau? What is to be done with the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the beating sun of the Sudan and Somalia and who trudge back and forth endlessly in the haphazard camps set up in desert areas? In an Africa that respects laws of hospitality less and less, how is one to prevent young and intolerant governments from allowing themselves the luxury of driving back refugees from their territory on the pretext of security or a temporary reconciliation with their neighbors? The 1,300 refugees drive out of Zambia at the beginning of the year at the request of the Luanda government are an example, as are the trades of refugees in November 1983 between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. And finally, who will take care of the 50,000 refugees of 33 nationalities who are waiting in Austria, some for two or three years, free to move about or in their camps, such as Traiskirchen?

Are these 10 million refugees to be discreetly left to die?

Emerging Solutions

Given this human bottleneck, the international community is slowly providing so solutions. For the time being, they are theoretical -- with a few exceptions,

as in Pakistan, with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank and the High Commission on Refugees.

One first of all thinks of the voluntary repatriation to native countries. A few Laotians have successfully tried it. During the early years of decolonization, Africa also registered successful returns. There are other possible "round trips," particularly in Latin America, when democratic openings succeed the dictatorial shadows rather rapidly.

Another solution consists of integrating refugees into the new country. With respect to most developing countries, this solution encounters inadequate infrastructures, a lack of water, jobs, land or natural resources.

Elsewhere, there are possibilities of relocating refugees to countries on the same continent as the native country. For ethnic, cultural, climatic and psychosociological reasons, the prospect is interesting. However, the host governments must find some benefit beyond a generosity whose origins can only inspire distrust.

One could finally take measures to prevent the squandering of financial aid that evaporates in the channels (where is the proof?), if not eaten away by the inflation of the dollar. Must one not also limit the number of international officials, more comfortable in board room conferences than in the field of operations? However, these are insignificant solutions compared with the real problems. Furthermore, it is correct to say that the humanitarian organizations demonstrate effectiveness (compared with other costly and useless international organizations). The Intergovernmental Committee for Migrations is part of these operational tools serving its member or observer governments (47). Since 1952, discreetly and in the shadow of an all-powerful High Commission on Refugees, the Committee has transported over 3 million refugees to their final asylum. Who knows this or tells about it?

In the meantime, the problem of the refugees has since 1950 been "international by nature." Western governments will therefore continue to finance the multilateral programs of assistance following the fairly well-respected principle of Equitable Burden Sharing. For the High Commission on Refugees alone, budgeted sums for 1984 for the 20 largest programs amount to \$402 million. This sum should be increased by the \$362 million requested by the Second International Conference on Assistance to African Refugees held in Geneva on 9-11 July. One should also add the budgets of the other international, intergovernmental organizations or of the 250 charitable organizations (ONG [expansion unknown]), which are essentially American or Scandinavian. By way of example, the 400,000 Indochinese refugees in Thailand cost the sum of 1,276,000,000,000 francs for the year 1980 alone.

Humanitarian Machine in the Camps

The status of refugees is defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 agreement protocol. The 1969 OAU Convention (theoretically more generous than the 1951 Convention see Article 1, paragraph 2) settles the legal fate of

refugees in Africa. A whole battery of other texts exists to protect refugees in the camps, except from air attacks, firmly condemned by the High Commission at the 1983 General Assembly (point 93 of the debate).

One must also emphasize that humanitarian aid generally permits true material survival of the refugees in the camps. Does this mean that the worst has been avoided? Does this mean that mankind has therefore shown its most generous face? Certainly not. Under the gloss of official reports and well-oiled administrative procedures, the humanitarian machine reveals blameworthy excesses, whether because of men or the existing systems.

How is one not to be shocked by the arrival of huge Canadian transport planes on the island of Guam when Saigon fell, instructed to pick up the most highly educated refugees and leave the "not so good" to other countries? Whether true or false, the rumor continues and does not help governments who proceed in like fashion. How is one not to comment on the number of Western medical teams burdened with ultramodern and unadapted equipment at the time of the second period of installation of the Sakeo camp on the Cambodian border in December 1980? How can one not be confused by the sight of Anglo-Saxon nurses in T-shirts bearing the picture of Jesus Christ, preaching the Bible to refugee orphans, the best-looking of which have more chance of receiving their affection than the ugly or infirm? How is one to explain to refugees in the camps that they cannot work because it would upset local economies? Without work, idle, their dignity wounded, the refugees have more children. At the Nong-Kai camp on the Lao border, the result is that there are always more refugees, despite all the departures in the past seven or eight years. How is one to congratulate Air France which, with the support of French authorities, reserves for itself the monopoly -- a lucrative one during the off-season -- for carrying refugees on the Bangkok-Paris line? Crews have never been truly trained to give proper attention to these special passengers, who sign for the Committee a pledge to pay back the price of the ticket in 18 months! How is one not to wonder about the "American way of life" when the Cuban refugees, without sponsors in the United States and piled up since July 1981 under the Miami cloverleaves because of Castro's expulsions, then found themselves in federal prisons for the slightest theft?

Is man thus a wolf for other men, even in his apparently generous enterprises? Perhaps. It remains to be seen.

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SCHILTZ ON FLEMISH MOVEMENT, REGIONALIZATION PROBLEMS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 26 Sep 84 pp 19-27

[Interview with VU Minister Hugo Schiltz in the offices of KNACK in Brussels: "Schiltz, or Wrestling with the Angel"; date not given; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] Community dissatisfaction has sharply flared up again, but VU [People's Union] Minister Hugo Schiltz feels that all those "issues" haphazardly cut up and veil the basic problem. Whatever happened to the big Flemish project? He was the guest of our editorial staff.

Question: You have not made a secret of it lately: the Flemish organizations seem to have become deaf-mute. Everything is quiet.

Schiltz: I have noted that, yes. Take the issue of Brussels, which was so sensitive about 5 years ago. At that time Flanders was apparently lying in wait to keep the agglomeration of the capital and its "Brussels" claims under control. Well, since then all kinds of things have happened. As a full-fledged third region, Brussels exists more than ever with a pronounced financial patronage system. It has its own administrations, its own ministers and who knows what else. This happened quietly, without parity in the structures, but nobody said a word and everybody lets it happen. Another example was the major hold-up around Cockerill-Sambre [CS]: both at the level of financial participation and of the social fate of the average worker, CS has unequivocally enjoyed a patronage system. All of this was allowed to happen without further ado and was even presented as a kind of victory, so that no political complications to speak of occurred. Ten years ago such patience would have been unthinkable.

Question: For Brussels the explanation may be that the para-political exempt who structure Flemish life there, have now found their place in the unofficial structures and hence do not want to alarm Flanders. As a matter of fact, they are saying: time works in favor of the Flemish inhabitants of Brussels.

Schiltz: It works primarily and nearly exclusively in favor of the immigrants. Virtually no future political arrangement is possible for the capital without keeping those people thoroughly in mind. They are the sociologically dominant group of tomorrow whom it will not be possible to continue keeping out of the

decisionmaking process. Up to now they have been randomly kept out of the structures, but they will arise as soon as people start looking for a Flemish-Walloon settlement. They will join the discussions.

Question: That is only one example?

Schiltz: What is much worse is the fact that the Flemish Movement no longer seems to have a single project. I challenge you to tell me what it is currently striving for: reformed unitarianism, federalism, confederalism or separatism? With all the good will in the world I do not know what it is really striving for. The traditional leaders of the traditional Flemish Movement are beating about the bush. You can go in all directions with their statements. It was different in the past; there were always concrete demands: the splitting up of the province of Brabant, keeping Louvain Flemish, adjustment of seats, no language census... It looks as if there is absolutely nothing on the agenda now.

Question: Isn't there somewhere a call for defining Flemish economic interests relative to an insatiable Wallonia?

Schiltz: Yes, that rings through mutely, it is a "leitmotif" in the background. But the Flemish Movement is not taking a stand on the maintenance or blowing up of a Belgian monetary union. They talk rather vaguely about more "independence" without making it clear whether it should be sovereignty or more mellow forms of federalization.

Question: But the state reform has been there since 1980. Didn't it calm down the spirits with all those legal and constitutional techniques?

Schiltz: Yes, something like that demobilizes. After all, Flanders now has its own government and a normal people can be active through its own institutions with mandated political representatives. Germans never need to demonstrate because their "Land" leaders neglect their rights; in that respect, their "Lander" and their federal state are clearly organized. I am afraid, however, that the young Flemish institutions are full of people who, deliberately or not, react in a schizophrenic manner toward the traditional Belgian authorities. As a matter of fact, they belong to a large extent to parties which don't make a clear choice either. And yet it is the Flemish Movement which brought them there and not the Belgian center. They try to reconcile them through intellectual acrobatics, but that does not succeed. There is no motivating project and virtually no outlook on the general social context in which it should exist: Flanders also consists of unions, universities, academies, the VEV [Flemish Economic Association], quite a number of political cabinets... and yet it seems to me that the Movement has to make do with a rather weak intellectual staff. I see one exception to this: there is definitely mutual interaction between the Flemish government and the circles within the VEV which are involved with Flanders' Technology; there is no need to make any secret of that. There are people there who are working on giving form to the Flanders of the future. But elsewhere they are scarce.

For the moment the VEV is really the only mobile wing; it is sitting there in the cluster between the Flemish business world with its missions abroad and its reports on industrial policy and the cabinets of the Flemish Executive. This may sound a little flattering, but it happens to be true: do not underestimate the role which the Flemish and the Walloon business worlds have played in the formation of their regional mentalities. Look, that doesn't mean that I therefore exclude the importance of the social institutions. And it is unfortunate to have to observe that of so many necessary segments (thus, once again those unions and universities and you name it) only the industrial segment functions a little today. It is the only sector with at least a partial project, but it does not constitute the Flemish Movement.

Question: You are talking here about social groups which form a kind of political free enterprise. And yet, in a normal democracy that project should be carried out by ordinary political parties.

Schiltz: It is on that account that they have never played their ordinary role in Flanders.

Question: Not the VU either? It seems for the moment rather obscure too.

Schiltz: You are right about that. The fact is that it displays to a large extent the prevailing lack of clarity in the Flemish Movement. It is its reception center. During the years following Egmont it had to operate in a Flanders which talked a great deal about federalism, but then a kind of federalism which could not be understood by political scientists. The idea had something to do with separate-from-Belgium, but it had no legal sharpness. There is no shame in that, but it does make the drafting of a policy difficult. The VU, in turn, reflects the haziness of the federalist tendencies in Flanders, partly because the party rejects solutions which are "not realistic." Thus quite a number of people want Great-Netherlands, and they can find a beautiful intellectual foundation for it. But those are projects for which you have to mobilize energies for half a century and which in the meantime do not contribute much to improving the existing situation. The VU is not directed toward that kind of unattainable goals.

For the rest, the party has seldom been as calm and as balanced, perhaps a little too calm for my taste, as today. It is pleased when reports and brochures are drawn up. Remember though that half of our members participated in a written survey, as a result of which the party has been exposed all naked as it were to the remainder of public opinion. Now we know precisely what a VU member thinks and how he reacts. Through the survey we have learned that, purely emotionally speaking, two-thirds of our members hanker for separatism. But an equally large number also expressed their realism: in Western Europe as it is, Flanders is a part of the Belgian fact. I find this control of the emotional responses remarkable. Hence, our policy should be directed toward confederalization, toward new talks with Wallonia, not toward the question "what could we pinch away from the central government" but the opposite: "What do we want to take in hand ourselves and what do we leave to the national state, by way of Flemish-Walloon summary?" To turn around the point of departure, the binoculars. That is, if you ask me, the position of the VU today. People like

Minister Eyskens sometimes acts a little ominous about it and talks or writes the VU into the camp of separatism.

In the process they forget that their own rank and file in the back kitchens definitely do not think differently from us. It is a trick from the flea market.

Question: By separatism, do you mean separate Flemish and Walloon economies with their own currency?

Schiltz: Yes, a Flemish and a Walloon franc, or ducat as far as I am concerned. Meanwhile do not forget, however, that the single "Belgian market" which is sometimes still referred to, such as by Andre Leysen, has been gone for a long time. Except for a specific sector here and there, such as beer for example, that market has become a fictitious concept. To a very large extent, such as for government institutions for example, in the eyes of the Walloons Flanders is a foreign country and vice versa. The signs of protectionism are numerous there.

Question: Could the cooling off of the Flemish Movement be related to the economic crisis, to the preference of the people for steak?

Schiltz: Historically this does not entirely fit. In the past all the great moments of growing national consciousness in Flanders coincided precisely with economic crises: the revolt of the House of Orange against Spain, the thirties in our own century. At that time 100,000 Flemish veterans demonstrated in Brussels within the framework of mass unemployment, when social support systems were mostly lacking.

Popular Zeal

Question: Today the notion of "crisis" involves much more than social problems alone. It involves a kind of fear with regard to numerous simultaneous changes all over the world.

Schiltz: That is true, but the way we as a people should navigate and operate in those changes is a collective task. And in that respect, I have observed that the Belgian collectivity does not work. It has completely unsettled the specific internal financial economy of the Flemish, the product of their "popular zeal." It has worked destructively with regard to everything that is earned, taxed and spent here. With all that chaotic and irrational bungling our political culture also became corrupted. The state, the public structure, is not experienced as an authority but as a useful object which parties, unions and ideological pillars must take possession of in order to heighten their own power. The public sector is misused.

About 3 or 4 years ago it looked for a while as if the Flemish public had largely seen through that situation. At that time studies were published, such as the Matthius report on the national industrial sectors or the one by the professors from Louvain on Flemish financing of the Walloon deficits. In a somewhat mysterious manner the Belgian leaders -- and Wilfried Martens' responsibility is very striking there -- managed to sweep those kinds of things under

the carpet. The people are constantly robbed of correct information. As soon as the budgetary principles of our national economy are concerned, the conspiracy of silence begins to work.

For 3 years I have been asking questions obstinately: show the parliament, the people the real figures. But I don't get them; they simply answer that I am probably a separatist. The lid is not taken off. If a situation occurs like the KS [Coal Mines of Campine], then they immediately focus on that part of the balance, and they talk about this or that many billions, but an overview of the whole is not given. They refuse to draw up the total account, and if the GERV [expansion unknown] tries to do it anyway, then the central administration answers scornfully: that is full of Flemish activists. In a normal country it should be the government which constantly draws up the balance, together with its administration and inspection of finances, its national institute for statistics, its planning office and so forth.

Question: Why don't you give us the correct balance then, in order of magnitude?

Schiltz: One-third of the total deficit of the whole Belgian public sector is caused by Flanders and two-thirds by Brussels plus Wallonia. For economic production the relationship is the reverse: there Flanders produces two-thirds of the total and the French speakers the remainder. For exports the Flemish share even runs up to 70 percent. Thus: with separate accounts Flanders would be one of the European frontrunners in terms of balance between income and spending. It also has a deficit today, but still one of reasonable size.

Question: You want to put a stop to those transfers to Wallonia? There you collide with the philosophy of national solidarity which may be to the advantage of one now, but later perhaps the reverse.

Schiltz: The transfers from Flanders to the French speakers should first of all decrease in volume. And then, realizing that in geopolitical terms Flanders cannot break out of the Belgian triangle, I am asking for political counter-payments for those transfers, which will have to be negotiated. Payments such as: respect for the market mechanisms in the economy and for the political borders within which the Flemish community lives. That linguistic obtrusiveness and the making of demands on Flemish soil must come to an end once and for all.

Question: A topical question relating to the transfers involves the future financing of the Flemish coal mining industry in Limburg. You say that the Walloon steel is treated much better than the KS.

Schiltz: Minister Eyskens would like people to believe that there is a global balance. "After all, over the last 35 years the Limburg mines have received about 100 billion francs in subsidies," and that is then supported to compensate vaguely for 100 billion francs to Cockerill-Sambre. That is a gross simplification. It should first of all be added that during the same period the Walloon coal sector also received 100 billion francs, so that the balance is about fifty-fifty. Even more: since the implementation of the Gandois plan

the central government has left the steel plan of May 1981 alone and has come up with an extra 50 billion francs to the benefit of CS. In other words, it paid two-thirds of the extra charge.

Meanwhile, in July 1982 a "management contract" was drawn up for the KS with a 31.9 billion franc envelope for operational losses in Limburg until 1987 and 2.5 billion for investments. Now that we know that the KS losses will continue for a longer period of time, the central government announced that it has no plans at all to pay two-thirds of the extra charge. Worse yet, the /promised/ indexing of the envelope (that is 31.9 billion francs then) will not be implemented. This was decided last summer under pressure from the Walloon ministers.

Anyone who dreams that Flanders should, under its own power, demonstrate its solidarity with the Limburgers should know that the Flemish administration does not have a single financing channel to the KS at its disposal. Even if there were money, which there isn't, the Audit Office would not allow me a single expenditure in that direction.

Learned at School

Question: Should we direct our energy policy even more toward nuclear power stations then?

Schiltz: I am certainly not pleading unilaterally for nuclear energy. I do believe in the cleverness of man to the extent that the problems surrounding the fission materials cycle can be handled and solved. However, gigantic budgets are needed for the development of research and the relevant procedures. Unfortunately, the Flemish politicians have allowed themselves to get caught in a trap: after the CS settlement which is going to paralyze us budgetarily for 30 years, a regional future perspective is no longer attainable. Don't forget either that the financing mechanism for the five national branches of industry has been conceived in a very peculiar manner. It involves income from the central state (inheritance duties) which will be federalized within the accounting of that central state, and this through decisions made exclusively for that central state. That arrangement was sold as being an actual regionalization, but that is humbug.

Question: Wallonia in turn claims that Flanders is unilaterally favored by the construction of the infrastructure in Zeebrugge, the operation of which will as a matter of fact be very deficit producing.

Schiltz: Now don't accuse me of Antwerp chauvinism, but I do believe that in the matter of Zeebrugge they are guilty of a certain administrative megalomania. Whatever the case may be: expenditures for Zeebrugge have hardly been debudgetized as was the case for the CS, and the construction of those installations will earn money mostly for Wallonia and Brussels. For many years to come, the Walloons will be supplying stone which they can no longer get rid of anywhere else in the world. Furthermore, Zeebrugge is controlled by the large Brussels concrete lobby, which is tied primarily to the Societe Generale.

Question: What is your opinion of the socio-economic policy of the Martens V administration in general? The competitive strength, income cuts, the drop in domestic consumption and taxation.

Schiltz: In the government plan, two points have never been right. First of all, the size of the budgetary catastrophe was much greater than was ever admitted. That is the result of our camouflage policy in the past: Belgian budgets do not serve to inform parliament but to mislead it. Secondly, the Martens V administration was not able to do anything about important elements of rigidity in our society. Our entrenched associations (scientific, union, industrial) did not have enough imagination to throw really new models of production and social relations into the economic game. That is no longer acceptable in a world which has changed so much. The negotiation baronies are still behaving as they did 10 years ago. The competitive strength has been restored, they say, and it is even true to a certain extent, but that did not lead to a more labor intensive climate in the enterprises. That can be achieved only through new relationships of cooperation and the exercise of economic power. Am I, with my request for a new social consensus, pleading for a more right-wing Flanders in which labor would be protected less? No, because I don't underestimate the Flemish unions. It is not because we are in Flanders that the economy will experience a social idyl. I do believe, however, that our own negotiation bodies here -- the ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor], the ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] and the VEV -- are somewhat less mortgaged and produce more soberness.

Question: One of your major causes, in addition to social consensus, is the demand for a new "political culture" in Flanders.

Schiltz: Yes, and I like to connect it with the overall picture of our educational system. A good part of the Flemish Movement resulted from the commitment ethics which existed and was experienced in the high schools. Here one is reminded of all those noteworthy teacher figures. They inspired the individuals with the premise that one has to do something for society. The Flamngantism of the teachers had a deep strength. When I recall that, I often look at my children and irresistably the following sentence comes to haunt me: what did you learn in school today, "dear little boy of mine?" I am afraid that the social support function of education, and seen this way its political call, has become blurred with all those experts in every course, with the small amount of interconnection among the subjects, and with all the union protected teachers who have their minds on their own kids who are in a daycare center somewhere during the day and for whom they quickly have to go buy pampers at night.

Question: There is still idealism which is born in school. In Flanders, the number of people supporting the green movement has already reached half the size of the VU.

Schiltz: The children of our militants are now members of AGALEV [Live Differently]. Hence, we have made a mistake, been lacking somewhere. That was probably because during the seventies the VU was virtually totally absorbed by the struggle for the political survival of Flanders, for our own institutions. For us the seventies were somewhat like wrestling with the angel, and

that apparently did not appeal enough to the younger generation in a time of great sensitivity to the environment and of distaste for the traditional style of government, economic decision making and the like.

It would be worth the trouble to find out whether contacts between the VU and AGALEV could not be built up. In many areas the green doctrine corresponds to federalism: the preference for regional projects and a policy tied to the environment, resistance to militarization (nuclear missiles), centralism and ideological division. I am afraid, however, that AGALEV and similar movements in Western Europe are going to outdistance themselves. They are making enormous jumps in thinking which organizations, groups and forces cannot keep up with. You need time, people and meetings for the development of a social image. I am afraid that political reality is often too commonplace to give such forms of idealism as the Green Movement a lasting opportunity. I am sometimes afraid that the Greens will prove to be a little too green. Also, Flemish voters have little compassion for purely intellectual projects; they have developed the habit of seeing politics as a grabbing for power. To get your turn.

Even the problem of unemployment does not escape that political calcification. We in the Flemish administration have let expert policy memoranda be drawn up by professors and experts who proceed from the proposition that there will never again be a society with full employment. Hence, that we will also have to give different social definitions to the concept of labor and the concept of unemployment. Do you think that the unions with their political antennas have shown any kind of interest at all in this very thick file? Not at all; those reports were immediately stored in the drawer.

And what is more compelling than the idea of a specific Flemish breakthrough on the international scene? I don't call that an independent Flemish diplomacy yet, because I know the implications of international law. But to affirm the identity of our people in the world is an obvious necessity. However, anyone who believes that a Flemish minister of foreign affairs will actively participate in this process is naive. The opposite is true; the old politics maintains its supremacy. Ideas are not enough. I would like to explain that also to the people of AGALEV.

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PROBLEMS WITH FLEMISH SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY ANALYZED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 3 Oct 84 pp 13-16

[Article by Frans Verleyen: "A Soft Depression"; passages enclosed in slant-lines, printed in italics]

[Text] Lately, the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] has been talked about again as a patient with strange diseases. Quite a number of accounts are also being drawn up within the party itself. The situation is far from simple.

Nothing comes as a shock, we do not recognize any crisis situations, we are calm. It was Monday, 1 October and during a small meeting with the press in the Tweekerkenstraat the changing of the guard in the CVP was announced and explained. National party Secretary Ludo Willems "has expressed the wish" to give up his office, and he will be replaced by 34-year-old Leo Delcroix, a man from Campine who became related by marriage to Limburg. A couple of degrees, teacher and later personnel director in the brewery of Bertie Croux (list head for the European elections of 17 June 1984), and finally assistant director of the Federation of Christian Employers. He wants to become a good "political manager."

The passing of the baton took place with remarkable, nearly objectionable indifference. President Frank Swaelen, who returned tanned and fit from abroad, thanked the old employee and welcomed the newcomer faultlessly. Next he read the list of subjects which were discussed during the morning meeting of the party executive: Philippe Moureaux's insults at the festival of the Walloon community, the Council of State about BRT [Belgian Radio and Television - Flemish Service] reporter Daniel Buyle, Le Pen in Schaarbeek, and the unprecedented rejection by the ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor] of the central agreement between unions and employers.

But there is more. At the beginning of the political work year, the president invited the three parliamentary party leaders to talk to the media: Guido Verhaegen, of the Flemish Council, gave an overview of the coming negotiations and decree proposals. He said that the CVP message of 11 July must be implemented "in order to give form to the Flanders we want to build." Senate parliamentary party leader Bob Gijs kept it much shorter. He also noted about 20 active or upcoming initiatives in the Senate and rounded off everything with a renewed act of respect for the Martens V administration. "Without the policy of his government, our country would already be in a more wretched state today

than we have ever experienced outside the war years." Finally, Luc Van den Brande, from the House, went over a 7 page document with numerous technical initiatives (and some of them are not bad) to revalue parliament. However, he also expanded on the people oriented, popular, solidarity "sign function" of a Christian democratic member of parliament.

It all glanced off, like water off a duck's back. I thought those who were present were preoccupied with the /malaise/ in the CVP of which not a word was said here. One of the reporters filled out the distributed list of those present: Daniel Buyle, Council of State. Another one: PM [expansion unknown], BRT, /"with hesitation."/

Between Us

It did not break loose, it started slowly, like rain in October. But the last few weeks brought something of a bad season over the CVP. It was said that there were too many contradictory statements. The coalition partners made a fuss (Guy Verhofstadt: "... is the CVP really going to go on?") and on Wednesday, 26 September, LA LIBRE BELGIQUE made concrete the feelings of dissatisfaction by publishing an opinion poll which announced a "free fall" in the Flemish and Belgian popularity of Wilfried Martens. Perhaps even worse: the CVP now appeared to have the support of about 28 percent of the Flemish voters and of about one-seventh of the Belgian electorate.

This was preceded by weeks, if not months, of political coolness. Or years?

A few days of talks, eating and even drinking with top party members did not produce a decisive answer, but numerous indications of what might be going on there. One striking thing about those contacts was: "Let us talk about that between us, but off the record." Name no names. Always a bad sign. Following is an inventory of the kinds of things which came up, told sincerely and at the same time worriedly. When hearing those stories anyone who is not a Fleming would bristle and exclaim: why don't you tell us all that straightforwardly, then everyone will be better off. But no, we are cautious and time will bring insight. Nothing has been lost yet, the socialists are no better. God knows, perhaps there will be an economic recovery in 1985.

Actually, they carefully explained, the inventory begins in the year 1978 with the psychological warfare between Prime Minister Leo Tindemans and Wilfried Martens, party president. The former governed on the basis of the Egmont pact which he himself constantly made suspect, and the latter did not govern, but he defended the cabinet program. Woe to the observer who puts anything on paper about this complicated fraternal quarrel: he is acting in bad faith, even though he has to experience the flesh and blood quarrel daily.

This was followed by Leo Tindemans' "coup" at the Antwerp congress where the formation of the Martens I administration was discussed. In a masterful speech and to the consternation of the CVP establishment, Tindemans talked himself into the presidency of the party. After the ovation followed a difficult relationship between party and government. Until Tindemans finally went to Foreign Affairs, where he still is, and Frank Swaelen left the office of Minister of Defense to make the party once again /calm and united/.

At that time we were already in the eighties and actually also in today's situation. Clear agreements were made with Swaelen: he will keep a low profile for the party president, repudiate participatory, and give the government full precedence. The mayor of Hove stuck scrupulously to that agreement, whereupon in the municipal council elections of 1982 the CVP was virtually unable to recover any of the electoral defeat it sustained in November 1981. The same occurred on 17 June 1984, this time for Europe.

Worse even: between April and December 1981 the CVP took it upon itself to make its own Prime Minister Wilfried Martens disappear for a 9 month trip into the political desert and to replace him by another Christian democrat: Mark Eyskens. Today people are still musing about all that blundering and posturing with one general certainty on which everyone agrees: Frank Swaelen did what he was asked to do.

Self-questioning

However, the inventory includes many more self-reproaches than this sultry episode in the history of the party. The man who does not mince words on this subject is naturally Eric Van Rompuy, current co-worker of Leo Tindemans, former president of the CVP-Youth, successful but failed candidate for the European Parliament, shortly candidate for the House and perhaps also for the presidency of the CVP.

It is undoubtedly true that Van Rompuy almost completely summarizes the party's problems and broadcasts them. He feels that at the moment the CVP is in a state of panic because of its "lamentable situation": as a matter of fact, in recent years it has lost one-third of its votes. The CVP is tired. The Martens V administration is conducting a sound policy, but with bad results. The party cannot absorb that because all its bigwigs are in the government and Swaelen must by definition remain without a profile. The CVP is now operating on a nearly defensive basis for fear of elections. And yet they are at hand; they can be deferred at most only 3 or 6 or 12 months. It is not able to turn the Flemish economic weight in Belgium to its own advantage against people such as Jean Gol or Philippe Maystadt. That is abnormal, because 8 out of 10 Belgians do not belong to the CVP.

Thus, objectively speaking, the party is no longer in a position to shoulder the problems of the fatherland. "Why should it be the last Belgian party instead of the first Flemish party?" Today it has already virtually lost its government majority, so that tomorrow it could be subject to socialist blackmail. That must be avoided at all cost, if need be with a new president who, like himself, would belong to the younger generation. This does not mean that Van Rompuy wants to do something against Swaelen; he regrets that it was felt that way, but there is not much time left and one piece of bad news after another is coming in. The budgetary deficit for 1984 will not be 510 billion francs but 550 to 560 billion. The study day held by the parliamentary party at the Lake of Eupen, in Butgenbach, produced no waves. Parliamentary party leader Luc Van den Brande himself is no longer very reliable following his pirouettes around the national and regional financing of the Campine coal mines.

Van Rompuy's approach is remarkable. He conducts himself completely and publicly as a dissident and clearly plays all or nothing. A newspaper like DE STANDAARD usually pays benevolent attention to his appearances and his statements; that is not a bad trump card. But last Saturday he was virtually put under a ban by the ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] newspaper HET VOLK which, nearly aggressively, wrote that he had gone beyond the limits of loyalty.

As a matter of fact, the young iconoclast does not say everything in the long, terribly honest interviews he gives away.

Numerous Christian inspired publications constantly recall other political incidents which undoubtedly remain hanging in the public's memory. They point to the strange "heartlessness" of a cold CVP which does not keep its ministers from regularly praising themselves, which comes across as arrogant. As a matter of fact, the government cannot deny the failure of its major goals (less unemployment and a healthier treasury) to materialize, and the few positive results (inflation and the balance of payments) have little significance for the ordinary people.

One has the feeling that the results of the "self-questioning" within the ACV are not frankly discussed and made public. The Christian union wants a better grip on the members of parliament it has sent out, but how do you do that? And then there is also the probably well intended propensity for internalized, /Christian/ values in the daily life of the CVP. Mark Eyskens feels that the deconfessionalization went too far and that Christian democracy should be more a "movement" in the field. Not to spout away about politics, but to get moving to help our fellow man. On another floor of the party building this is discarded as "pastor's talk." The CVP must learn to act /naturally/, according to the generally accepted rules which a party must submit to: to be obviously present in districts, villages and cities.

Disappointments

This in turn does not fit with the appointment of Luc Martens, currently head of the IPOVO [expansion unknown] Training Center, to assistant national secretary and, in particular, in charge of "movement tasks." This 30 year old is also very much taken up with the moral and even emotional sides of the political business. "To bring a bit of warmth." Talking to him everyone would actually forget that Wilfried Martens is dealing with enterprises, wage formation and taxes.

The main problem, however, will be the distance between faith and works, or even simply the fact that the ever promised results do not materialize. Every quarter, the government -- with which the party under Frank Swaelen virtually completely identifies itself -- announces that "it will soon be possible to pick the first fruits of the recovery policy." Those hopeful claims have had wide currency for nearly 2 years now. Every time, however, a disappointment occurs some place (such as recently a 51 billion franc deficit in the energy account which had been overlooked), as a result of which a climate of general skepticism has developed even within party ranks.

The community balance under the Martens V administration is plainly bad; that can no longer be hidden. The fact that Jose Happart is mayor and may well be for a long time to come, is not the only fact to play here. The actions of the Walloon ministers in favor of Cockerill, the military orders, their own telecommunications industry, Walloon aviation and even Pegard are but a few examples. The obfuscating vocabulary of the Flemish government members, always caught in the choice between giving in or a government crisis, has become rather irritating to the Christian rank and file. The same woolly use of language exists in terms of the further evolution of the state reform. Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene says that he considers new national party structures to be indispensable (a step back to unitarism), whereas the parliamentary party leaders are talking about a new legislature which will once again have to review the constitution in the sense of a more independent Flemish government and Council.

It seems that no matter what issue becomes the focus of public interest it will, in a strange way, turn out to the disadvantage of the CVP: the sinking of the Mont Louis, television commercials which have to remain nationally regulated, the role of Tindemans relative to NATO or the Russians, the so-called actual regionalization of the national branches of industry. We are always left with the feeling that the CVP wants to take too many directions at once. That is punished then by some communique or other from their own ranks. On 23 September the CVP-Youth were talking about the failure of the budgetary policy, no less, and of the "puppet mentality" in the Pegard affair, shortcomings which according to the CVP-Youth cannot be undone with performances by individual ministers.

Even parliamentary party leader Karel Blanckaert's departure for the Court of Arbitration was coupled with quiet resentment about his succession. As is well known, the succession went to Luc Van den Brande, but his image was already tarnished because last summer he had let his noisy proposals about Cockerill-Sambre "be put in the cooler" without much further muttering. Wouldn't it have been better if it had been Luc Dhoore, a former minister whose presence at all parliamentary meetings was extraordinarily exemplary and who could perhaps have had some extra knowledge at his disposal concerning the distressed area of Limburg? Perhaps the latter problem -- which was painful for the CVP -- played a role in the appointment of Leo Delcroix as national secretary. But he himself denies that; he is nothing but an imported inhabitant of Limburg, and furthermore he believes that that province should take an inward look: remarkably few DAC [Development Assistance Committee] projects are submitted for approval there and small businessmen are far too scarce. There is a shortage as it were of bakers and butchers.

Pax Christi

It is not quite acute yet, but a long delay is no longer possible: it seems that the American cruise missiles will be deployed. Three hundred Americans are already working in Florennes and we cannot continue to act as if "the success of the Geneva negotiations" could still influence the final decision on the stationing of the nuclear arms system. Tindemans is doing his best to advocate negotiations. But, according to a poll, three-quarters of the Flemish Catholics are opposed to such a stationing which, according to government

logic, has become inevitable. A year ago, numerous CVP members of parliament demonstrated in the Brussels peace march. And last week, ACV supported Pax Christi once again published a report in which they wrote that small NATO partners should reject the new medium range missiles. What is the Martens V administration supposed to do with something like that? It all pushes the wrong way, from its own ranks, and often reminds one of the figures of the CEPESS [Center for Political, Economic and Social Studies] Study Office which always fall like a cold shower on the government's announcements. Yes, the tax pressure has risen. No, exports have not increased since the devaluation but went down in 1983. No, the competitive strength of the enterprises has not definitively been saved. Etcetera.

The CVP is a party with approximately 110,000 members, an estimated 250,000 designated government clients, and only 43 out of 212 seats in parliament. Hence, it resists the allegation that it is a gigantic power machine. The new secretary general feels that it is even necessary to strengthen the party's presence in the outside world. Henceforth, the member paper ZEG (circulation: 90,000) will be cranked out on a weekly basis and no longer every other week, and if possible it will be provided with advertising. The few people who are working in the information service now will be combined with others to form a team of approximately 10 workers in the so-called /communication cell/, including the CDO [expansion unknown] broadcasting service. Communication.

But if there is so little power to be defended, why then keep up the agonizing uncertainty about the upcoming election date? Many people in the party already regret that the government did not voluntarily go to the polls in the course of the year, on 17 June for example. Martens did not want that, as a result of which an endlessly long election year is in the offing, with the painful implementation of a shaky budget and the preparation of a new budget for 1986.

In all party documents, lip service is given to the fact that the Martens V administration should hang on until the end of the ride, until December 1985, following an amendment of the electoral law to permit serving 6 months longer than had been accepted so far. However, as soon as the text was written and the meeting closed, nobody made any attempt to hide his disbelief about the completion of this legislature. They did agree that the administration should hang on until the new year: the 1985 budget, the recovery laws and the extension of a number of special powers decisions still have to go through parliament. Only when that has happened will everybody have free hands. The first political accident to come along (for example at the time of the budget check in February) could then serve as a reason for a good breaking point.

However, it is far from certain that the Council of State will be kind enough to respect this timing in issuing its advice on Happart and his associates. Those in the know have announced that the arrests will take place at the end of the month. Martens would have to be able to guide the case to the final Court of Appeal in order to get a respite. However, parliamentary party leader Van den Brande has already stated: never, or at least not with the CVP.

8463
CSO: 3614/17

SIMILARITY OF USSR, U.S. GOALS DENIED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 6 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] The United Nations and other factors which play a role in the Cyprus problem both at home and abroad do not fail to point out and underline that our problem is the only international issue on which the positions of the two superpowers coincide, as concerns finding a federal solution. These factors say the United States wants a solution so the fundamental dispute between Greece and Turkey, which is upsetting NATO's southeastern wing, will disappear. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also wants a solution because it has information the Americans are building military bases on occupied Cypriot soil, and therefore a solution would impede them from proceeding with these plans. This analysis contradicts the theory it wishes to prove--namely, that the two superpowers want a solution. As long as the United States wants the occupied territory for bases, it cannot want a solution of the Cyprus problem, at least not in accordance with the official declarations about supporting the unity of the Cypriot state. There is more of a contradiction, however, in the Soviet position. If it wants a solution in order to impede the establishment of NATO bases in the north, why is it not trying at all to pressure Turkey for concessions on the Cyprus issue rather than only pressuring the Cypriot Government, through AKEL, to make more concessions, and thus encouraging the Turkish side to proceed in its partitioning plans, which serve the creation of bases? And do not let Moscow and AKEL tell us that the Soviet Union is not in a position to pressure Turkey in its own way. The two countries have extensive common borders and have signed many agreements for cooperation in many sectors. The reason why the Soviet Union from the beginning has supported Cyprus only with words and never with actions is that it did not want to disturb and endanger its interests with Turkey. And it is only on this point that its policy on the Cyprus problem does not differ from that of the United States.

9247

CSO: 3521/79

ANTI-WEST GREEK POLICY RAPPED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 12 Nov 84 p 5

[Editorial: "Hopes and Prayers"]

[Text] We want to beleive that what the prime minister of Greece, Andreas Papan-dreou, mentioned in his congratulatory telegram to re-elected U.S. President Reagan is not ceremonious and incidental talk. Because the hope expressed by the Greek prime minister, that "during the length of your new term, the relations between our two governments will develop to the benefit of our two peoples whose time-honored friendship is indisputable," is the hope and prayer of all of Hellen-ism. Greece belongs by nature and position to the western world; therefore, it has every reason to maintain the best relations with the greatest western power and leading country which can help Cyprus emerge from the tragic and dangerous position in which it is found today. Careless statements and mistaken actions and maneuvers by the Greek and Cypriot leadership, which may be characterized as having anti-western barbs, do not benefit Hellenism in any way. On the contrary, they are exploited by our "relentless" friends and the Turks, and contribute to obstinate indifference to our issue on the part of precisely those from whom it is possible to expect some assistance.

9247

CSO: 3521/80

OZGUR STATEMENT POINTS TO TURKISH, GREEK CYPRIOT LEFT UNITY

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 7 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] Ozger Ozgur's recent statements, in which the Turkish Cypriot party leader calls the two communities to find ways to unify Cyprus on the basis of UN principles, are true evidence of two crucially important facts: First, that within the Turkish Cypriot community, broad political forces are supporting the same political goals promoted by analogous forces in our community. Second, the patriotic Turkish Cypriot forces are defying the Turkish occupation and sovereignty of chauvinistic elements, and are courageously raising their voices on behalf of the rights of Cyprus and its people as a whole. Despite the adverse conditions and dangers, they are spurning Ankara's interventions in the Turkish Cypriots' domestic affairs and they are severely criticizing Denktas' policy, up to the point of seeking a popular mobilization to remove it.

A now common phenomenon made some political circles in our own community disparage these patriotic Turkish Cypriot forces, distort the goals of their brave struggle, arbitrarily identify them with the chauvinistic Turkish Cypriot leadership and scoff at the Greek Cypriot Left because it considers the Turkish Cypriot struggles our brothers for the unity and independence of our land. It is not only a mistake, it is deceit to cultivate the impression that within the Turkish Cypriot community there is only Denktas and the chauvinistic adherents of partitioning. And the line of alienation, backbiting and even confrontation towards the patriotic Turkish Cypriot forces, instead of rapprochement and cooperation with them, is undermining our cause. The ability for Cyprus to be saved, to be unified and to become again autonomous and territorially intact will be achieved with the joint struggle of Greek and Turkish Cypriots who believe in their common future in a common land under a federal system, as the summit agreements provide.

9247

CSO: 3521/79

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY MEETING

Meeting Opens

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 10 Nov 84 p 1

[Excerpts] With the message, "Cyprus is not alone! The world is with Cyprus today, tomorrow and forever," conveyed to our people by Romes Chantra, the international conference for solidarity with Cyprus organized by the International Committee for Solidarity with Cyprus began on 9 November at the "Filoxenia" hotel.

Taking part in the conference are 120 members from 47 countries and representatives of 14 international organizations.

The meeting was opened with a brief welcome by the secretary general of the Coordinating Committee of Parties and Organizations, Tapakoudis, who called the members to a minute-long silence in memory of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The start of conference proceedings was proclaimed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Iakovou and the alternate minister to the president, Minister of Education Katsellis, read a message from President Kyprianou. Also attending were AKEL Secretary General E. Papaioannou, the ministers of labor and justice, the deputy secretary general of PEO, P. Dinglis, the dean of the diplomatic corps, Astavin, the ambassadors of Cuba, the GDR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Rodriguez, Schurat and Botchev, other members of the diplomatic corps, deputies and other officials.

Romes Chantra

The president of the International Committee for Solidarity with Cyprus and president of the World Peace Council, Romes Chantra, conveyed to the conference the greetings of the hundreds of millions of people on our planet who are fighting for peace and disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and independence and sovereignty of all nations.

Chantra referred to the international activity of the International Committee for Solidarity with Cyprus for 10 unbroken years. Repulsing, he said, the NATO conspiracy to divide and destroy Cyprus at every international conference and national gathering for peace in which we have taken part, we have lifted our voices on behalf of implementation of the UN resolutions on Cyprus, withdrawal of the occupying troops, the right of the refugees to return to their homes and for the cause of the missing persons. Every year we have organized an international conference of solidarity for Cyprus, he added.

WPC Called Soviet 'Hireling'

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 11 Nov 84 p 3

[Excerpt] This mockery every so often with Romes Chantra and the International Committee for Solidarity with Cyprus, which costs us some money, must finally stop. This gentleman, and the World Peace Council of which he is leader, are nothing but hirelings of the Soviet secret services. They are included on the official list of "front line" organizations financed and used by Soviet propaganda to pursue its goals throughout the world. If we wish to maintain our gravity as a state and government, we must break away from such ridiculous situations which the whole world is aware of and laughs at behind our backs.

9247

CSO: 3521/80

NEUTRALITY ADVOCATED IN NATIONAL POLICY

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 12 Nov 84 p 3

[Excerpt] When we argue that we must realistically confront our problem and must be aware of the dimensions and our possibilities, it is not only so we can chart a correct and feasible course. It is also so we can see how we will conduct ourselves and how we will act to secure the greatest possible international support.

It was with this consideration that the columns of our newspaper rebutted several weeks ago certain reports which hastened to characterize actions of the UN secretary general as pro-Turk. It is with this consideration that we firmly believe we do not have the luxury of increasing our enemies. On the contrary, the dimensions and our possibilities dictate to us the need to increase our friends, and if in certain cases it is impossible for us to make friends of those who oppose our struggle, at least we can neutralize their opposition to our people's struggle.

This is why there must be no room for anti-Americanism and anti-Sovietism in the thoughts of all the Cypriot political leaders. At this moment we do not have the problem of selecting a social regime and economic system. No political faction is broaching such an issue, such a target. Our struggle aims at something else: The country's salvation from serious, real dangers and our people's survival. Our struggle is passing through the stage of the fight for liberation.

It would be the greatest naivete for us to demand that the foreign policy of various countries be accommodated absolutely to the needs of the Cypriot struggle. This is the highest of impossibilities. The various countries have their own interests and needs. Aside from Greece, we know no other country which could endanger its other interests for the sake of Cyprus. This does not allow us to underestimate and de-emphasize the theoretical support provided to Cyprus by statements and by vote in the United Nations. This kind of support is, moreover, a restraining element to the implementation of plans catastrophic for our land.

Let us not forget that one of the ways to fortify our struggle--perhaps the best--is our own correct political line, the determination for ourselves of feasible goals. Such a thing empowers our own side and weakens all those who have formed plans at our expense.

ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE AKEL DOOMED TO FAILURE

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 14 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by G. Kolokasidis]

[Text] In recent weeks we have become witnesses to a renewed anti-communist and anti-AKEL campaign which reminds us of the "good old times" of anti-communism. The chief protagonists in this campaign are I SIMERINI, O AGON and O KIRYKAS--the Sunday dwarf suffering from giantism.

The focal point of this campaign is the Minimum Program, which is receiving volley fire and the demand it be denounced as "anti-national" and "disruptive." Circles from the known renunciative front are presenting themselves as alarmed about the ruptures in the domestic front, for which the Minimum Program and its line are supposedly responsible. And, of course, in order to get past these ruptures, it is an indispensable requirement to denounce the Minimum Program "so the way can open for a broader unity" (O AGON, 5 November 1984).

The things about the "anti-nationality" and "disruptiveness" of the Minimum Program have been discussed more than enough in the past and have proven to have no leg to stand on. So why do certain people return, more acrimonious, to this falsehood? What kind of "broader unity" will this be which they preach they will build after the Minimum Program is denounced?

As the same people so revealingly acknowledge, their purpose is the "shrinking of AKEL's suzerainty" (I SIMERINI, 7 November 1984). Taking into account that this kind of "suzerainty" never existed, it is not difficult for one to perceive that the real purpose is AKEL's political isolation, and denouncing the Minimum Program is nothing but the means to achieve this isolation.

Thus, behind the "touching" concern about the unity of our domestic front, which supposedly is being harmed by the Minimum Program, is a well-planned effort to form an anti-communist front and politically isolate AKEL, just as the fifth AKEL plenary session had ascertained and charged.

But why has this new anti-AKEL hysteria "coincided" with the current, so difficult phase through which the Cyprus problem is passing? Is it perhaps chance? It would be a mistake here to believe that the sole reason for the rekindling of anti-AKEL feeling is the momentum of the enemies of Democratic Cooperation, particularly of AKEL.

The moment the de Cuellar initiative was revealed, it was met by the enraged attack of the renunciative forces, who called it a pro-Turk, partitioning initiative. By contrast, AKEL, correctly assessing matters, took its well-known position in favor of the initiative and this has stood, to a great degree, as an impediment to the effort for the new de Cuellar initiative to have the same fate as last year's "indicators." For the "renunciators," it is clear that as long as AKEL plays a decisive role in our country's political affairs it will be difficult for them to torpedo the de Cuellar initiative and pave the way for other kinds of "solutions." It is precisely for this reason they are furiously trying to isolate the party of the working class.

It is very difficult for these other kinds of solutions to be proposed while the de Cuellar initiative continues. If, however, in spite of hopes, the rapidly approaching talks lead to an impasse, then we can be sure there will be many well-intentioned people outside of the UN offering solutions and their services. Many times, information has been written in the press about U.S. plans and solutions "made in the U.S.A." which are already being prepared so they can be placed on the market in March 1985.

All the supporters of such solutions know very well that they will find on their way the great impediment and resistance of AKEL. In its long history, AKEL has always been an obstacle to the anti-Cypriot, partitioning, double-enosist and, of course, pro-imperialist solutions which westerners have proposed at times. This is the reason, perhaps the most important one, why the nationally "irreproachable" but open and secret double-enosists and pro-imperialists want to neutralize AKEL by isolating it politically, so it will stop causing the "allergy" (I SIMERINI, 8 November 1984) of the Americans--that is, stop being an impediment to their plans at Cyprus' expense.

The plans and intrigues at AKEL's expense, the purpose of which is to politically isolate it, must not be underestimated because any success for them would have unexpected repercussions for the future of the Cypriot people as a whole.

On the other hand, those who are effecting AKEL's isolation should know that they are undertaking a very difficult task--something which colonialism and the darkest opposition failed to accomplish in the past, a mission too heavy for their strong political shoulders. And this is because AKEL derives its role and political placement from the relations it has with the people because it is one with the people and cannot be isolated from the people!

9247

CSO: 3521/80

BRIEFS

ASSISTANCE TO ENCLAVED--By the end of 1983, the total number of enclaved was 1,250 people, of which 875 were Greek Cypriots and 375 were Maronites. Government aid to these people amounted to 385,000 pounds in 1982. Of this amount, 173,000 pounds were given in the form of allowances and 212,000 were spent to send food, household items and other primary necessities. These facts were set forth in the Ministry to the President's first annual report for 1983, and it is added that the year under review was devoted to creating the necessary organizational substructure in the ministry. [Excerpt] [Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 6 Nov 84 p 14] 9247

AKEL 'MOLE' IN DIKO--According to our information, which has not been disputed, there is a person in the highest DIKO [Democratic Party] political body who is informing the AKEL leadership in detail about what is being discussed among top officials in Spyros Kyprianou's party. As our information relates, Kyprianou's close associates have noted repeatedly that what has been said at various meetings is coming to AKEL's knowledge. They also point out that this fact shows the extent of AKEL's infiltration not only into the state machinery, but also within DIKO. In the meantime, according to our related information, the person informing AKEL has been detected by senior officials in the governing party. [Text] [Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 31 Oct 84 p 1] 9247

SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBERS--The festive events for the sixty-seventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution began yesterday and will continue all week. A three-member delegation from the Tadzhik SSR arrived day before yesterday to participate in the "Days of Tadzhikistan" celebrations and events organized by the Cypriot-Soviet Friendship League in all the cities. The delegation is led by the vice-president of the Tadzhikistan Council of Ministers, Mirza Babayev. Also participating in the delegation are Habib Babayev, director of one of the country's great factory complexes, and Sergo Siaripov, alternate president of the Tadzhikistan Friendship League. The distinguished guests were welcomed at the Larnaca airport by the directors of the Soviet Cultural Center, Vl. Titayev and B. Misliatsev, and the representatives of the Cypriot-Soviet Friendship League, A. Pyliotis and K. Nikolaidis. [Excerpt] [Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 6 Nov 84 p1] 9247

PAPERS REPRESENTING CP FACTIONS INTERPRET ELECTION OUTCOME

'Majority' Organ on 'Message'

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 24 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Outcome"]

[Text] It would be amiss if the most significant political inference of the local elections were lost sight of in involved explanations: The elections were an uncommonly powerful social protest voiced by hundreds of thousands of citizens. It was manifested both by not voting and by supporting the green and independent candidates.

The pressure for change behind the protest surely is directed in large measure against the techniques employed in politics, against the slackening in social morality and instances of corruption. Also the hopelessness of many voters is reflected of course in this protest because there appears no remedy in sight for these problems, for example, for unemployment.

The protest nature of the elections makes it incumbent particularly on the people's democratic movement to revert in its mode of action to its original sources, to open up organizations more than ever as channels of influence. And in the light of this political experience as well it is even more important than before that the movement's own political alternative be based solidly on the working class sense of values and be built on the principles of justice and solidarity.

Contrary to what was argued on election night the election results have a substantial effect on government policy. Surely the administration can in no way say that this vote bolstered support for its policies.

SMP's [Finnish Rural Party] catastrophic drop from its parliamentary election figures forces the party to reexamine its government policy. The relative success of the Center Party lies in the fact that it is perceived more and more sharply as following the policies of the Social Democratic Party. SPD's [Social Democratic Party] decline by a couple of percentage points from its parliamentary election vote was a much greater setback for SDP than appears at first glance. It serves to stir dissatisfaction in the party's left wing, particularly as regards the government policy of the party.

The preservation at the very least of the previous level of the strength of the Conservative Party, the main bloc of the right, paints a disagreeable picture of the administration policies.

In consequence of the general effect of all these factors, one can say that the structure of the present administration and its policies has not emerged completely without blemish from these elections.

The elections brought to the People's Democratic movement the very important political message that the decline in the support for the movement that took place primarily during the years 1980-82 has come to a halt when compared with the parliamentary elections, and in many places the trend is changing slightly upwards.

This is happening in a situation where all the news media trumpeted, week after week, the inevitable collapse of the People's Democratic movement, and one political setback followed another.

On account of all this we feel a sense of moderate satisfaction in the election results--despite the great decrease in the municipal council membership. At the same time we are deeply conscious of the fact that decisions on problems cannot be shunted aside. A sounder political integrity of the movement must be brought about, and the election outcome bespeaks once again the obligation to keep striving for unity within the framework of the same party.

Stalinist Organ on SKDL Setback

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 24 Oct 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Election Outcome"]

[Text] Although all the information necessary for detailed analysis of the municipal elections result is not yet available, certain conclusions can already be drawn now.

The first result of the elections, which must not be lost in the shadow of other important perceptions, is the strengthening of the swing toward the conservative side in Finland which has gone on now for several years. This is shown in the increased support of the Conservative Party and in the declining number of adherents to the left, particularly to SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]. Total support of the left now is at a lower level than at any time in the postwar period, not including the presidential election of 1962. The leftist majority in many municipalities was transformed into a middle-class majority.

The share of the Communist and Social Democratic votes dropped 2.8 percentage points in the last local elections and in the parliamentary elections 0.2 percent. SKDL lost one-fourth of its municipal council member positions and 80,000 votes. It is a deception of the public to explain that a crystalclear defeat is a victory by alleging that a certain unreliable Gallup poll at some juncture came up with a result even worse.

A second, likewise noteworthy, result of the elections is their known "protest nature," however ambiguous this term well may be. The percentage of voter turnout remained very low. The greens achieved important wins everywhere they set up candidates. Many "wild" groups met with success. The composition of municipal councils in many localities changed significantly. One could argue that this shows a burgeoning growth of dissatisfaction in the consensus politics presently in vogue.

However, it is important to bear in mind that this "protest" is above all at the expense of SKDL and even the entire left movement, not them becoming stronger, which could have been the situation. Certainly there is protest, but not of the sort that would mean turning away from the rightest development. But neither is it unambiguously supportive of that.

The importance of this kind of analysis which gives the impression of splitting hairs lies in the fact that, whereas, for example, the rise of the green and certain other analogous phenomena is greeted as a positive "protest," indispensable decisions on sharpening the policies of the Communists and Social Democrats can easily be forgotten and left undone. We surrender ourselves to the current fashion and reach for something new and merely "novel," and blindly seek collaborators without forgetting to pose the basic question as to why our movement is in a continuing decline.

Likewise, it would be detrimental not to recognize that the "protest" existing in a situation favoring a turn to the right does not unambiguously serve the conservatives, that it is a search for a real alternative to the conservative policies as pursued, which does not find an alternative for many reasons in the policies of the Communists and People's Democrats. Therefore, one must seek collaboration wherever possible. The honing and rationalization of just our own political and ideological work are the basic conditions of an effectual collaboration.

We may draw two further important conclusions in addition to those put forth in this column yesterday as regards the Communist and Social Democratic movement.

First and foremost, those who spoke and acted on behalf of party unity lost considerably less, proportionately speaking, and indeed won here and there, more than did the party disrupters.

And second, the election outcome speaks in crystalclear language against the breakup of the party. The SKDL defeat was greatest where the party leadership scattered the slate of candidates. Whereas SKDL lost in the local elections in the country as a whole by 2.8 percentage points, the loss in Helsinki (average votes by slate) was 3.3, in Espoo 4.5, in Vantaa 3.6, in Nurmijarvi 5.1, in Tuusula 4.6 and Hyvinkaa 7.4 percent. The needless defeats in numerous localities paid for the disorganization and resulted in the decrease in the total share of the vote, without counting in other harm sustained.

The most important conclusions to be drawn for the Communists and the Social Democrats therefore is clear: the necessary condition for the increase of its support, and even its preservation is to restore the unity of the movement,

to discontinue the disruptive actions immediately, to return the party by means of an extraordinary party congress to a policy line consistent with its main objectives. There is not another task more important than this, nor is there a moment more to lose.

9655

CSO: 3617/27

PAPER SEES SWEDEN BECOMING MORE OUTSPOKEN AGAINST USSR IN UN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Sweden a Surprise at UN"]

[Text] Sweden has criticized the Soviet Union much more strongly than usual in the Afghanistan debate which has become a regular autumnal event in the UN General Assembly. According to Swedish charges, the Soviet Union severely misuses its military superiority and is guilty of superpower arrogance. In Sweden's view, the conduct of the Soviet Union violates the international law of recognized common respect, which as such is a fundamental factor in the national security of small and medium-sized states.

Sweden has not previously concealed its criticism of the Afghanistan occupation either, but Ambassador Anders Fermi's speech is nevertheless a milestone. One must go back a decade and a half to find a greater point of comparison, when Sweden's Social Democrats under the leadership of Olof Palme ran a vehement campaign against the war waged by the United States in Vietnam. Yet Palme's scathing condemnation in those days reminds us that the Soviet Union has been allowed to conduct its war in Afghanistan for 5 years virtually without any international condemnation, at least on the level of public demonstrations.

Sweden is not just striking a balance in its denunciations of the superpowers. Looming behind the increasingly critical stand is Sweden's new appraisal of the international situation. The leaders in Stockholm have obviously arrived at a clearly more pessimistic assessment than before of the prospects for high-level politics. At worst, it is to be feared that Fermi's speech on the threat to the position of small states is a direct consequence of the violations of Swedish territory by Soviet armed forces. Sweden has, of course, tried for a long time to enter into talks with the Soviet Union, but appears to have found the superpower's attitude arrogant in the manner expressed by Fermi.

And yet international tension is increasing when a state like Sweden--traditionally recognized as neutral--is incapable of establishing a dialogue with the superpower. After all, the reason for the split between Stockholm and Moscow is not Sweden's abandonment of neutrality in favor of the West or in opposition to the East. We have to assume the reason for it is Sweden's inability to grasp the Soviet Union's aims or maybe the Soviet Union's unwillingness to explain them.

It is perhaps also possible to see Sweden's accusatory speech at the UN General Assembly in a different light, one less dangerous from Northern Europe's own point of view. Sweden's traditionally moralistic line rings true when the Soviet Union is accused of unscrupulous use of military superiority. After all, the Soviet Union has charged the United States with likewise pursuing a position of superiority.

The uncompromising speech could even be seen as part of Sweden's domestic policy, which is intensifying due to the elections that will be held next autumn. The Swedish political parties have already made a domestic political weapon out of neutrality. It would be irresponsible, however, to use the UN speakers' podium for crass domestic politicking. That is why Sweden's government must have had weightier reasons.

The competitive situation between the two leading superpowers may result--along with safeguarding of strongholds--in attempts to divide up the gray areas as well. The breakoff in relations between Nicaragua and the United States is also crowding at the UN threshold to offer a new example of the position of small states.

If Sweden had merely wanted to act once again as the world's conscience in the UN, it is obtaining a surprising supporter thanks to the events in Nicaragua. Now Norway has just finished criticizing the United States for violations of Nicaraguan airspace. Norway is thus improving its reputation concerning international law, a reputation which suffered a severe blow last spring after Foreign Minister Sverre Strømme granted the United States the right to interfere in the independent Central American countries.

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KAISA RAATIKAINEN NAMED NEW MINISTER OF INTERIOR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Nov 84 pp 3, 12

[Article by Ritva Remes: "Kaisa Raatikainen Advances to Minister"]

[Text] Parliamentary representative Kaisa Raatikainen of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) will become the Sorsa government's fourth new minister at the beginning of December. However, Raatikainen will not receive the portfolio of Minister of Social Affairs Vappu Taipale (SDP), who is leaving to become chief director of the social welfare administration. Instead, she will be made minister of the interior.

Taipale's portfolio will now be given to a man, Minister of Communications Matti Puhakka (SDP), and Social Democrat Matti Luttinen, who up until now has been minister of the interior, will undertake the management of communications affairs.

The SDP political committee decided on the minister transfers Thursday. The President may appoint the new minister and order the portfolio transfers next week.

The selection of Raatikainen as minister was justified by the fact that she is one of the longest serving representatives in the SDP's parliamentary group. The Social Democrats had decided that the new minister would be a woman and a parliamentary representative. Raatikainen was regarded as suitable for the post of minister of the interior because she has long been active in municipal politics in Espoo.

Matters involving municipalities, counties and the police will fall within Raatikainen's province. She becomes the first female minister of the interior in Finnish history.

Raatikainen, 56, has been a parliamentary representative since 1970, and she is now deputy chair of the SDP group.

Is That So, Said Erkki Raatikainen

"Is that so?" said Erkki Raatikainen, when Kaisa Raatikainen phoned her husband and briefly disclosed that she had been asked to serve as a minister.

Further explanations were left until the evening of that laborious day. Sorsa's future minister of the interior probably had some explaining to do. Kaisa Raatikainen broke out into laughter Thursday evening and mused, "If only I don't end up packing."

The political background of the Raatikainen family is part of the big surprise--which is what Kaisa Raatikainen considered the SDP party committee's choice to be--in the appointment to the ministerial post. Erkki Raatikainen is a former party secretary of the SDP and former chief director of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation. Raatikainen retired from the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation against his will, and SDP chairman Kalevi Sorsa has experienced the consequences of the retirement decision in the form of anti-Sorsa diatribes from Raatikainen's caustic pen.

If family politics was one factor for Kaisa Raatikainen, another was certainly the fact that the future lady minister of the interior is not a candidate of the SDP's "boys." At least not in the sense that the boys would be able to order Kaisa around, any more than they do Erkki. Raatikainen's broadsides at Sorsa have not extended to Kaisa, who in political performance has followed her own line, chosen her own viewpoints and stuck with them.

Examples of Kaisa Raatikainen's decisions are the EEC vote at the start of the 1970s and the subsequent parliamentary bill concerning aerial dissemination of underbrush-preventive agents.

Kaisa Raatikainen, who belongs to the SDP's left flank, opposed the EEC agreement, and without any further speeches she abstained from voting--she did not vote against it.

She stuck to her guns on the underbrush prevention issue, wanted to give the counties the right to decide in accordance with the party's earlier resolutions and voted against the agreement made in the government. The SDP parliamentary group led by current Minister of Environment Matti Ahde chastised Kaisa Raatikainen with a reprimand. The law recently assumed a form on whose behalf Kaisa Raatikainen fought. Matti Ahde is also considered the architect of the selection now made for minister of the interior.

"The Day Began Poorly"

Kaisa Raatikainen came to the Parliament on Thursday morning with no idea of the party committee's intentions. She met some parliamentary representatives, "comrades," in the newspaper room and suspected that the day which had begun poorly could continue to get even worse. The slides from her trip to the Soviet Union had turned black upon exposure to light at the Tallinn customs, and a troublesome council session from the previous evening still weighed heavily on her.

At that very moment the telephone rang. "This is Kalevi speaking." Sorsa asked if Kaisa would agree to become minister of the interior.

Kaisa Raatikainen answered, "This can't be true," and asked for some time to think.

Sorsa said, "That's not possible, the party committee is in session right now."

The candidate for the ministerial post asked the prime minister to picture her as a minister. She reminded Sorsa of her ways: "I can't change, I'll only become more radical."

Sorsa said he was familiar with Kaisa's ways and asked her to say yes.

Kaisa Raatikainen had a small stipulation for the decision: that she be able to picture herself as a minister.

"The more I thought about it, the harder it seemed. I've never in any way been able to picture the matter beforehand."

There is reason to believe in the surprise created by this appointment. Erkki Raatikainen and the "boys," Kaisa Raatikainen's obstinacy--the foundation is nearly the same as that of the late Tellervo Koivisto (from Tampere) in her time. The good points in the independence of the parliamentary group's grande dame are admitted, however: when the group was wallowing with youthful vigor in new ideas, Kaisa Raatikainen injected some realism, which was later acknowledged to be correct.

In terms of her views and her positions--she is not in the good graces of the party leadership--Kaisa Raatikainen has belonged to the SDP's group of strong women, which has been continued, after the death of Tampere's Tellervo Koivisto, by Pirkko Tyolajarvi, considered a friend of Kaisa Raatikainen. The President's wife, Tellervo Koivisto, is also mentioned in the same group of friends.

At the same time Thursday evening as Mauno and Tellervo Koivisto were christening a ship with the help of Princess Diana and having dinner at the mayor's, Kaisa Raatikainen was recovering from her own tensions.

The parliamentary group and its roses had banished her apprehensions, and no longer did the ministry appear such a wild idea. Kaisa Raatikainen, advancing to a man's place in the ministry, mused with the answer she had given earlier, when rumors were rampant about the choice.

"One stool isn't enough for the minister of the interior, several stools are needed for that position."

12327

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GREMETZ COMMENTS ON PCF SITUATION, 25TH PARTY CONGRESS

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Oct 84 pp 4-13

[Article by Maxime Gremetz]

[Text] "The gentleman is a communist? How extraordinary! How can one be a communist?" That is undoubtedly how a well-known French writer (if I may be forgiven for plagiarizing) would now describe the way in which the little world of politics acts toward us.

The truth is that if one follows the reasoning of these so-called "informed" commentators, France is now divided into those who are "modern" and who understand that we have to continue to break French industry, to throw hundreds of thousands of men and women out of work in order to be "up to date," and a few backward souls, whose numbers are declining, who cling to worn-out ideas and analyses without any connection with today's reality.

Today's reality? If one looks closely at the present situation, it confirms the truth of the reflection that has led the French Communist Party to consider that it was faced with the impossibility of participating in the government.

In 1981, our decision to assume responsibilities at that level, within the framework of the choice made by the French people, had a simple significance: acting to promote any step forward, to contribute to the resolution of the country's problems, thus responding to the people's will. This permitted substantial social and economic achievements.

Despite our proposals and warnings, a deviation in the policies followed came about. It was subsequently confirmed and deepened, to the extent that in June, the sharp discontent of the voters led to a massive abstention expressed by a major decline of the Socialist and Communist parties.

While it was necessary to take that warning into account, to reorient government policy in a direction making it possible to move positively toward the solution of the grave problems facing the workers and low-income families in the country, it was the continuation and accentuation of the orientations that led to these results that prevailed.

How could communists, by participating in this government and with these policies, let it be believed that one could respond to the people's expectations?

The economic and social situation continued to decline. The government and the Socialist Party backed down on issues such as the schools, the law on the referendum, the law on the press. The prospects set forth by the 1985 Budget are alarming. Industrial employment continues to decline. Purchasing power is deteriorating, our foreign trade balance shows a deficit, while the profits of business and income from investments increase. The facts confirm that the orientation chosen can only lead to failure. We do not want to accept that.

In 1984 as in 1981, we had a major concern: not neglecting any possibility of improving things, of moving toward a solution of the problems, of progressing toward a way out of the crisis. That is why we support anything that appears positive to us, anything that moves in that direction. We fight anything that seems to be contrary to the interests of the workers and the country. It is impossible for us to find any "consensus" with the right. In short, it is the same reasons, the concern that the people's interests be taken into consideration and satisfied, that led us to enter the government three years ago and to cease participating in it two months ago.

It is because any resignation, any spirit of "withdrawal," are foreign to us that in the new political phase now beginning, we propose an innovative outlook: the formation of a new majority people's rally.

Some have not hesitated to disregard this proposal with a hasty "That's nothing new!" This is to ignore, as one will quickly see, an important effort of communists to respond to the concerns of millions and millions of French people wondering about the immediate present and the future.

This proposal is first of all based on a precise analysis of the crisis in French society. It is based on concrete conditions.

Denied by those who only yesterday called us persons addicted to the past, the crisis has worsened since the beginning of the 1980's. It is the crisis in the capitalist system and it affects all aspects, all fields of life in society. Technological progress -- changes of all kinds having come about within the confines of a system that places immediate financial profit above meeting human needs -- has been limited, hindered, altered and has become a means of new oppression, new blockage. We thus continue to eliminate jobs, shut down enterprises, sacrifice industries deemed "outdated." Funds are denied for research, education and training. Capital is squandered on meager results in terms of products and new procedures and all this in the name of modernization, actually at the price of destroying vital industrial potential and for the greater profit of a few.

But the crisis is also "an acute form of the conflict between the emerging new and the old, which fights hard for its place" (24th Congress). It is all the more felt because it hinders possibilities, demands, new aspirations that ask only to be expressed. The idea that it is inevitable has definitely made

headway. Furthermore, it is an idea fed by all other political forces in the country, including the Socialist Party.

Because the crisis is that of the entire French social body, it has fallout on social relationships, behavior, culture and ways of thinking, which may make it impossible to understand that it is possible to proceed otherwise. But at the same time, it gives rise to aspirations for a real renewal of all society.

These reflections -- discussed at the latest Central Committee meeting and to be deepened in view of the 25th Congress -- were present at the 22d, 23d and 24th congresses. They have led us to draft a strategy of democratic progress toward a self-management socialism. It is in that sense that we have said that we must confirm and continue this approach.

At the same time, we must go farther. We must learn all the lessons from a political period during which theoretical and political advances, aimed at making up for the lag in the party's strategic guidelines, have telescoped with an inadapted form of union. The implementation of our approach has been complicated that much more.

The necessary self-criticism of a long period of activity of the French Communist Party cannot help wipe away -- at the stroke of a pen or with one final word -- the fight of hundreds of thousands of men and women for social progress, freedoms, peace and their gradual drafting of a new project adapted to the real conditions. At the same time, it cannot duck the questions on this form of union or rally that we have proposed for the past 25 years.

As the Central Committee notes, "the social body does not register and does not pass on the effects of changes in leadership and new measures except with often major lags in time." Above all, it rightly adds, "when it is a question of fundamental choices that model existence, thought and behavior."

To say that is not to duck the issue. It is to observe that the French voters, mainly the communists, have been and remain marked by a long period of a search for a union, an agreement at the top behind a common program.

Without losing sight of the ideas that such a battle has advanced, the achievements it has imposed on the right and big capital, one has to observe that this form of union contained from the very beginning the obstacles, the handicaps and the difficulties that emerged until the current situation was reached.

Thus it was that in 1968, we characterized the events of May and June as "the first major confrontation between the mass of blue-collar and intellectual workers and the power of the monopolies, coming to grips with the contradictions that it cannot resolve."

But the Socialist Party's refusal to conclude a government agreement has led us, with the approach we then took, to consider that it was not possible to open up a political perspective responding to the new aspirations contained in the movement.

Another example: While we analyzed, as early as 1971, the crisis in French society in all its dimensions, resulting in the high level of solutions in order to emerge from it, we lowered the barrier for concluding the Joint Program, nourishing the illusion about the Socialist Party and about the possibility of changing society, rejecting or delaying the response to new aspirations. The period of the Joint Program favored the wait-and-see attitude. With every demand, the miracle program proposed a "response at the top." The criterion of support for the Communist Party thus became more fragile, reduced as it was to the acceptance of such an agreement. Our revolutionary identity was weakened by it. And one has to add that the Socialist Party -- and singularly, Francois Mitterrand -- profited from these weaknesses. They were worsened by the fact that in the presidential elections, we did not defend the idea of the imperative need for a communist candidate. We thereby fed the idea of a necessary weakening of communists for a victory of the left.

It was within such a context that the presidential election of 1981 transpired -- an election whose outcome was unfavorable to us, with the victory of Francois Mitterrand -- along with a decline of our party. A majority desire for change was expressed, not without illusions about the fact that everything would now be "settled." Our necessary participation in the government thus came about on the basis of the limited objectives of Francois Mitterrand. The hope raised by that victory was immense, the wait-and-see attitude very profound. At the 24th Congress, we considered that it was not inevitable that the policy waged should be oriented toward a social-democratic management of the crisis, on the condition that the people's movement would be strongly heard. Faced with the pressures of the right and management and the successive declines of the government regarding commitments made to our people, we stepped up our proposals and appeals for the intervention of the people, which, one must say, has been inadequate. The fact of being associated with the management of the affairs of the country, with limited means but in keeping -- according to the people -- with a policy that turns its back on their aspirations, has led to the fact that our attitude should be viewed as political, an idea supported by a continuing campaign on this theme (one foot in, one foot out). The result: millions of people disappointed, discouraged, discontent, and a weakened party.

Experience therefore shows that this is not the right path. We must not start all over in the same way, which would be total conservatism, archaism.

The new majority people's rally toward which we want to work constitutes a new and enriched conception of the union.

If the only possible way out of the crisis is democratic progress toward self-management socialism, what is decisive is the mobilization of those interested in acting to bring about the triumph of a given solution to the crisis.

With such a conception, it is the people themselves who decide how and why, without being reduced to the role of "puppets" of staffs that decide in their place what is or is not possible. There is no rejection in this of the union of the left and of agreements between political parties, which remain necessary as soon as they correspond to the real state of the people's movement, without sowing illusions, and help it to progress.

Never will we postpone the rally in action, the intervention of all those interested in solving the specific problems posed through solutions that attack the very heart of capitalist management.

In business, the decisive place of the specific confrontation between a logic of financial profitability and one that makes meeting human needs of prime importance, there are diverse social categories, different political and philosophical opinions, often "competing" organizations. But given such a problem of employment and production, is it not possible to rally together, transcending political splits, in order to implement a solution which a large majority of people, sometimes broadened to include consumers, others "from the outside" (commune, department, region) consider to be the best? This against the opinion of experts, bureaucrats, even politicians or the government?

Such an orientation refers one to things said or written, but if every cell asks these concrete questions about the reality in which it is plunged and while thinking about its past activity, then what a change! Can this new way of making politics not find a response different from the one surrounding us?

Since socialism must be built in France, with and at the speed of our people, since it can be only the whole ensemble of specific responses to the concrete problems which the crisis puts before society, then democratic progress will come about by these multifaceted rallies of interested parties in order to impose without delay solutions in keeping with the needs and potential that are expressed.

It is in concrete action and only therein (on the condition, naturally, of waging the political and ideological debate there) that the individual and collective consciousness of the necessary progress is forged.

A political and ideological debate? It is to be waged on all questions: the crisis, French-type socialism and socialist countries, the ideals and values that we intend to promote.

A society of justice, new growth, democracy, self-management (which presumes the harmfulness of some aspects of our institutions: the constitution, the exorbitant, almost monarchical role of the president of the republic), the broadening of human rights, a new rebirth of culture, the establishment of new human relationships. All key questions in the construction of French-type socialism which must be promoted in action and thinking.

The word "socialism" is often wrongly used. Even if confusedly, it is a universal aspiration, which tells one of the stakes involved.

It has been labeled as very "backward" recently. If one should managed to establish such an idea in our country definitively, then capitalism would have a fine future ahead! Moreover, points have already been marked up in that direction, one must admit. This emphasizes the absurdity of the temptation that would consist of getting rid of the so-called "burden" represented by the countries building socialism. The question must be debated forthrightly.

It is not from too great of a political and ideological effort on this issue that the PCF has suffered since the 24th Congress. We then indicated that we wanted to "evaluate as strictly as possible the contribution of the peoples building socialism, along with the diversity and current limitations of that undertaking." Neither an apology nor a heinous caricature, but efforts to study reality, as it is, without blinkers or prejudice. Without hesitating to express our opinion or posing as preachers. A great deal is left to do in this domain, on the offensive. We must discuss the facts, inform. The report adopted by the Central Committee provides the first elements in that direction.

Provided one will take the time needed to read it -- every communist has the possibility and duty to do so -- the latter opens up a motivating prospect.

Subjecting our proposals on every problem to reflection, promoting the broadest possible unity in action, in form and for progressive goals drafted in common, without asking everyone to agree with us on every point: That is our orientation, our line of conduct. That is how the shape of this majority people's rally that we want to build in life will take form.

Such a political innovation in French life demands the affirmation of a resolutely modern revolutionary party that can preserve its own independence.

What does that presume?

That it raise its ability to proceed toward a continuing analysis of the conditions specific to French society, of changes on the national and international levels and their consequences, this in all party organizations.

That it be resolutely oriented toward action, in order to rally the people, knowing how to find points of agreement with them, without any preconditions or "entrance examination." In many areas, it can -- the cell, every communist -- be the best mobilizer of action for solutions against the crisis.

That it wage the political and ideological debate on all questions, while listening to others, clearly and independently expressing its opinion.

Saying that is, it appears to me, not only to speak about a real change in the party, but to approach the means of engaging it. It is the business of each and every one of us.

The experience lived by the people, by communists, unfortunately proves that a weakening of the revolutionary trend hinders the possibilities of the progress in France of innovative solutions to the problems encountered by our people.

The time has come to tackle them, without impatience, but without further delay. The revolutionary tool exists, its principle of operation, democratic centralism, makes it possible to adapt it to the needs of the current fight, furthering the participation of every communist in the drafting and implementation of our policies. We are going to carry it further and test it together starting now.

On economic and social questions, various examples, from Creusot-Loire to Renault, show that potential can be rapidly expressed, that concrete areas of unity can take shape immediately.

Another example: At this time, people with highly diverse, even opposing, opinions, people who do not share our opinion -- far from it! -- on the causes of the serious current international tensions, come together in multifaceted action and call upon their comrades to support, to participate in a march for peace on 28 October in Paris: "In order that detente may be substituted for tension, that negotiation prevail over solutions of force, that there might emerge a balanced disarmament agreement and that the money swallowed up by the arms race be devoted to living works."

This is a new approach in our country, the wave of the future.

Millions and millions of blue-collar and intellectual workers have many reasons for mobilizing in many ways in order to halt the course of the current political situation and turn it around: employment, schools, purchasing power, the environment, life in the cities, disarmament, a new economic order, hunger in the world. They are attentive to what we say and do.

In their discussions, in their organizations and with the people, communists draw reasons for confidence. There is a great future for a French Communist Party working to build a new majority people's rally. It is a complex, difficult task, which is one more reason for communists to study and take up this new political approach, in order to put it into practice without delay, in life. Reflection and action are indispensable and enrich one another.

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MITTERRAND VISITS BASQUE REGION

Interview on Regional Subjects

Bordeaux SUD-OUEST in French 11 Oct 84 p 3

[Interview with French President Francois Mitterrand before starting on the Aquitaine leg of his trip, by Joel Aubert]

[Text] A reunifying President, intent on pressing the fight against unemployment and poverty, arrives today in Aquitaine. In an exclusive interview granted to SUD-OUEST he expressed optimism as to the enlargement of the EEC [European Economic Community], firmness toward the terrorism connected with the Basque question, and his commitment to making of the Greater Southwest an absolute priority.

[Question] The vast majority of French citizens appear to favor a dialogue between the opposition and the governing majority. Do you see in this a premonitory sign of an easing of tensions, a detente in the political climate? Does this encourage you to develop your theme of reunification?

[Answer] Assuredly. In several essential domains (defense, security, French influence, freedoms), the French must always be able to meet on common ground, to reunify. I would like to add to these a few other domains, such as the creation of jobs and the modernization of the country. As for the rest, which is highly important, it is up to the national representation to act in accordance with the mandate it received from the people to achieve the objectives for which it was elected. That is the law of democracy. I know no other one.

Electoral Law: Preferably in April 1985

[Question] Is there a genuine concurrence between the former president of the Republic, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and you, regarding the future electoral law?

[Answer] I have read with interest what he says about it in his most recent book. The balance he advocates between absolute-majority and proportional-

representation voting responds to a French reality. His suggestions will contribute materially to my own thoughts on the subject. However, as of the present moment, no decision has been reached.

[Question] When will the country have no further doubts on this question?

[Answer] Everything should be settled by 1985. Preferably during the spring session. Therefore, you will not have long to wait for a definitive answer.

[Question] Do you think the measures adopted by the Government to reduce unemployment, and particularly youth unemployment, will suffice?

[Answer] The primary weapon in the fight against unemployment is economic activity. This activity depends on France's ability to meet international competition. Hence the need to modernize all our productive sectors. It is an imperative. But this is going to be a long and exacting task; we fell too far behind during the 1970's. But it will be a long and exacting task; we fell too far behind during the 1970's. In any case, economic activity requires that the women and men called upon to sustain it, that is, the work force as a whole, be prepared for an ultra-rapid renewal of techniques and trained for the jobs they will have to perform. Hence the decisive importance of training our youth. To this effect, the Government has embarked on a very voluntary and very powerful program of action. But its plan for our youth also involves another consideration to which I attach an extremely high value: It is essential that the boy or girl coming out of school escape that terrible period of non-activity, of uncertainty, and finally of despair--with all that it entails in the form of individual, family and social disorientation--which today is affecting some 500,000 among them.

The municipalities and departments, the associations, the enterprises, all have a determinative role to play together with the Government in this fight in which the future of our civilization is at stake. A society cut off from its youth is lost. Truly, this is a national task.

The New Poverty: It Must Be Attacked at its Base

[Question] Have you issued specific instructions to the Government to address what is being termed as the new poverty?

[Answer] Unfortunately, this poverty is not all that new. The term harks back, if I am not mistaken, at least to 1979-1980, when it was used in a report for the European Community. No industrial country escapes this poverty.

What can the state do? First of all, address the causes, not limiting itself to repairing the effects. We are trying to approach the problem in depth: An unprecedented increase in social services, a broadening of social coverage, subsidies through the Dubedout-Pesce Commission on Blighted Urban Districts, priority-education areas, accommodations for single women, youth summer operations.

I have asked the Government to augment its effort in three directions.

First, families must receive without delay the family allowances to which they are entitled. Too many requests for aid come from families who are unaware of their entitlements this is the case with respect to housing allowances, which 180,000 families are either not receiving or are receiving late. A stop must be put to these abnormal situations.

Then, there is housing itself. Unpaid-rentals commissions were put in place in July 1982. A clear policy on empty housing needs to be defined together with local authorities, mayors and HLM [Low-Cost Housing Program] organizations.

Here again, it is at its base, on the spot, that the problem must be addressed. As you know, the essential responsibilities as regards social action rest now with the locally elected officials. Together with them, the associations, which are dedicated and efficient, and which are conversant with the concrete problems, must operate on a broader scale. Why should the state not delegate to them the supplementary funds needed to deal with the most urgent situations?

Spain Too Is a Considerable Market

[Question] Considering the sizable budget difficulties which Europe of the Ten is hardly able to cope with, are you not sympathetic toward the position of the French farmers, and especially those of the French Southwest, who consider that the entry of Spain and Portugal [into the Common Market] in 1986 would be a catastrophe not only for our regions but also for the Common Market farm policy as a whole?

In your opinion, are the failed negotiations with Luxembourg going to unavoidably delay the enlarging of the Community?

[Answer] First of all, there has not been a breakdown in the Luxembourg negotiations, but simply very slow progress over a very difficult terrain. Secondly, it cannot be said that enlargement of the Community would be a catastrophe. On the contrary. Provided, of course, intelligence and good sense are brought to bear, not forgetting that Europe, of which Spain and Portugal are an integral part, represents an opportunity for France. In sum, is it certain that all the farmers of the Southwest consider the entry of Spain and Portugal to be--as you put it-- catastrophic?

You will recall that, before the creation of the Common Market, many farmers thought that opening up our borders would result in the ruin of French farming. However, as you know, as of now, French farmers are selling twice again as many products as they were at the start of the Common Market. This vast market has increased their revenue. Today, no serious-minded farmer would dare ask that we abandon the Community.

I believe the same evolution could take place with the opening up of the Community to Spain and Portugal, for if Spain is a dangerous competitor for certain of our productions of fruits, vegetables and wines, it is also a considerable market for our corn, cereals, milk products, meats and even our fine wines.

It is the totality of these data that one must bear in mind in talking of enlargement, at least if one wishes to talk seriously about it. For, enlargements in themselves are neither good nor bad; enlargements are either well-prepared or less well-prepared. Great Britain's entry into the Common Market in 1972, for example, was badly prepared.

In the case of Spain and Portugal, the French Government is not hesitating to lay all problems out on the table; it is making proposals, neither concealing nor holding back on anything, at the risk at times of provoking tensions or difficulties with our EEC partners or our Spanish friends.

And this method has already yielded results:

--We succeeded in having adopted, in 1983, a settlement on fruits and vegetables that provides for an organization of the market close to that to which French producers are accustomed and which the Spanish producers will have to apply for their part. And it is on the basis of this settlement that the transitory period will proceed, lasting a total of 10 years. Negotiations are continuing on products termed "sensitive."

--As for wine, which is of less concern to Aquitaine but which continues to give rise to much apprehensiveness in other regions, I had stated at Fontainebleau what France was desirous of revising in the common organization of the market, and the other heads of state and of government backed me.

Undoubtedly, however, the Commission was not totally in agreement with what I advocated and drew up a document containing provisions that were unacceptable for French wine producers. We then had to let up somewhat: The French Government has proposed a modification of the wine industry regulations that would limit price guarantees to a certain volume produced, and this proposal is currently being studied by our partners, with a certain degree of interest...

As to the negotiations on enlargement, therefore, we have made some progress in an important sector of the Community farm policy. And in my view, this demonstrates that there is no contradiction between the Community farm policy and enlargement, provided the problems are properly put forth and addressed with the intent of following them through to their logical conclusion, before the enlargement and not after.

If all our partners show the same determination and agree to match their efforts, at the appropriate time, to the intensity of their desire to see Spain and Portugal enter the EEC, I am hopeful the negotiations will be concluded, at the latest, with the forthcoming summit meeting of the heads of state and of government, which is to be held in Dublin in December 1984.

Spanish Basque Refugees: Right of Asylum Is a Contract

[Question] Among the 110 planks of the platform on which you ran for election, you had envisioned the creation of a Basque Department.

Have you or have you not abandoned this plan?

[Answer] I hope the elected officials of the Basque Country will carry on to a conclusion the study that has been undertaken. A plan, though good in itself, must be examined from the standpoint of timeliness with respect to the evolution of events and viewpoints.

[Question] Does France intend to pursue on a selective basis a policy of extradition of the Spanish Basque refugees, and will it obtain the help of Spain in neutralizing the GAL [Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group] commandos who come over to hunt down these refugees on this side of the Pyrenees?

[Answer] Crimes committed in France by commandos claiming to be of the GAL are and will be severely repressed by the police and the courts. On the basis of the investigations carried out to date, 17 persons have been interrogated and 6 are imprisoned. These efforts will continue without letup. They are being conducted with the cooperation and full support of the Spanish authorities each time their help is needed.

Let me add that major security measures have been instituted to reinforce, by means of patrols and surveillance, the protection of the members of the Spanish Basque community living in Bayonne and its region.

As for the terrorism in France claiming connection with the ETA or similar organizations, it will also be vigorously combatted. It is too frequently not realized, and I emphasize the point, that the review to which the Government proceeds in order to respond to each request for extradition is but the final stage of a judiciary procedure, at the conclusion of which opinions are handed down successively by the highest French jurisdictions: The Supreme Court of Appeal and the Council of State. And it is not until all juridical recourses have been exhausted--an important innovation with respect to past practices--that the Government is called upon to make its decision. The recent decisions take into account the fact that Spain has again become a state in which minorities can express themselves through the free play of its democratic institutions.

A serious lack of understanding has led some to perceive in these decisions a bringing into question of the traditional right of asylum.

The right of asylum is a contract. He or she who requests asylum in France must renounce all violent action. One is not asked to renounce one's ideas and one's friends. One is asked to respect France's laws and its international commitments. In this regard, the three extradited persons could not claim the right of asylum and were using France as a military base, which has nothing whatever to do with the right of asylum. And all for the purpose of committing crimes of blood. I fulfill every contract that binds me.

There are political refugees of over 50 nationalities in France and we protect them. The same will apply to the Spanish Basques who comply with our laws. Not to the others.

Greater Southwest More Than Ever a Priority

[Question] The Greater Southwest Plan was accorded a high priority under the national development policy. In view of the crisis and industrial conversion problems, do you envision a change in this priority?

[Answer] The interest attached by the Government to the Greater Southwest since 1981 has not faltered; on the contrary. The 20 April 1983 Council of Ministers, which set the guidelines of our national development policy for the 9th Plan, reiterated the need to strengthen the development of the Southwest.

The Greater Southwest is clearly a priority from the standpoint of our national development, and I would say it is even more so in view of the opening up of the EEC to Spain and Portugal.

An example to illustrate this priority: In 1984, the three regions of the Greater Southwest will receive 35 percent of the budgetary credits allocated to agriculture under plan contracts as a whole. Of course, the state's action must take decentralization into account. From this standpoint, the Southwest Plan laid down before 1981, by Paris and without any real coordination, could not be pursued in its original form.

The solidarity effort of the national community is now based on the state-regional contract and the interregional contract, concrete expressions of the new dialogue instituted by decentralized planning. This will apply particularly to the major infrastructures of the development (communications, research, higher-level training), to the creation of jobs, and to the "redevelopment" of the blighted industrial basins.

In sum, this effort will be reinforced and supplemented by specific intervention operations, conducted jointly with the regions, to enable them to take optimum advantage of the enlargement of the EEC.

[Question] Will there really be regional elections based on universal suffrage before the end of your 7-year term?

[Answer] Yes, as is proper.

Speech in Bayonne

Paris LE MONDE in French 14-15 Oct 84 p 8

[Text] In Bayonne, where he was greeted by its UDF [French Democratic Union] mayor, Mr Henri Grenet, the head of state said: "The dialogue is open. We are saying to our Basque fellow-countrymen: What you are will be preserved and fostered so that the future generation will find intact the

heritage you received and will find it even enhanced. I shall always be on the side of those who want to exist as themselves to the very core, as bearers of a heritage that merits respect.

"If the question is whether that could be cleverly made to serve as a springboard for a later call for autonomy, meaning independence, I say clearly and without blinking an eye: With me, no. I will never allow the tissue of France to be pulled apart. And the vast majority of Basques will back me, if they have not already done so.

"Into that reality has been injected this sad affair of the Spanish Basques who have come into our territory to pursue their war. I am not their judge. I am not in a position to condemn. My duty is simply to see to it that the laws of France, on French territory, are respected, to refuse to accept a state of affairs wherein, by violent act upon violent act, by one side and the other, the Basque Country no longer knows anything but unrest, uncertainty, crime and death. To this, I say 'no.' The French security forces have received instructions to the effect that no weakness in this regard will be tolerated.

"The right of asylum is a contract. There are refugees of over 50 nationalities in France today. It is fully understood that refugees must conform to the laws of France. France cannot accept that on its territory this contract be broken by them, that France be nothing more than a logistical base for the committing of crimes in a neighboring and friendly country. It is inadmissible that crime should have France as its accomplice."

New Call for Reunification

"Any and every Spanish Basque who wants political asylum in France can obtain it as soon as he or she renounces the use of France as a base for violent action. Anyone who does not renounce such use is a combatant. France cannot lend that person a hand. Any foreigner who seeks to carry arms and to exacerbate rifts in France will be dealt with by the state and the nation, personified by the president of the Republic and by the Government, with firmness, resoluteness and, if necessary, severity. (...). The unity of France is one of the concerns, a deeply-felt concern, that, for me, is of the first order of priority.

On Saturday 13 October, Mr Francois Mitterrand spoke at Mont-de-Marsan, the final leg of his official visit to Aquitaine, before several thousand persons gathered around the municipal building--in that socialist municipality in which the sections of the PS [Socialist Party] had rallied in strength--affirming that "What the Government and its head are asking is being more and more clearly perceived by those who are on the terrain." He added: "We are seeking to establish greater justice; we are not saying to Frenchmen: Fight, one against the other. A large segment of France still suffers from having been exploited by the other. We are saying to those who have had the better of things that the time has come to help out more."

The head of state remarked that, in these difficult circumstances, "a certain lack of comprehension" is evident. "Does this surprise anyone? In any case, not me; it simply anchors even more deeply in my mind the determinedness so well expressed recently by the young prime minister I have given France. All those must be reunited who want to push back the crisis. France will win if we know how to respond to the social problems that confront us."

After evoking poverty, which "was not born today," he stated that "the social response will not suffice." The essential thing, in his view, is "the revitalization of the economy." "Why should we not sing the praises of those who have ventured? They have taken risks," he added. Mr Mitterrand concluded: "I am imbued with my love for France, for my country. We are and must be brothers. Brothers, despite family squabbles! You all belong to the same family. Reunite, so that France can succeed, so that she can win. Let us pursue our heading. Let us not be continually changing course. Let us stand fast wherever we must."

Saint-Jean-de-Luz Visit

Paris LE MONDE in French 14-15 Oct 84 pp 1, 8

[Article by Nicolas Beau: "Mitterrand and the Basque Question: Firmness and Consensus"]

[Text] "Let's be clear," said Mr Francois Mitterrand in Bayonne on 12 October. The speech made by the head of state in the Basque Country had the merit indeed of being clear: There can be no further doubt as to the forthcoming firmness of the French state toward the Spanish Basque refugees, at least those who seek to use France as a sanctuary; there can be no ambiguity as to the limits of governmental abetment of the Basque identity, which must be the springboard for any separatism whatever. The creation of the Basque Department, one of Candidate Mitterrand's 110 campaign promises, which, according to the head of state, remains "a good idea," has been postponed till later. "The evolution of the situation," he stated at Saint-Jean-de-Luz, "makes it clear that nothing must be done that could be interpreted as a concession, which would be seized upon, devoured by those wishing to play the game of maximalism."

The "firmness," the "resoluteness," the "severity," against these maximalists, announced today⁽¹⁾ by the president of the Republic, respond to a dominant sentiment in the Basque Country. The "unification," between Bayonne and Hendaye, has been in place since the beginning of the year

(1) Mr Francois Mitterrand, during his previous visit to the Basque Country, before he became president of the Republic, had stated, at Anglet on 20 August 1979: "We cannot accept that the Government should distill, to suit its political preferences, the right of asylum in France. The right is the right and whosoever shall request asylum in France to escape repression must be able to find security here."

against the Spanish Basques, victims of a growing rejection, going well beyond the merchants alone, and against violence in all its forms. The elected officials of the opposition were not the last to applaud this president of the Republic who is determined "not to permit the tissue of France to be pulled apart."

Mr Leclerc d'Orleac, the Bayonne mayor's RPR [Rally for the Republic] first deputy, said: "Gratified by the extraditions, I look forward to the head of state continuing on the course of firmness he has chosen to maintain a state of order in the Republic and safeguard national unity."

The denunciations of the "abertzale" [Basque patriots], who have only six elected officials throughout the coastal region, and the scarce public protestations of Socialist militants--none of whom have resigned--seem hardly of such nature as to trouble this quasi consensus. Even the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] carefully refrained from demonstrating together with the Basque nationalists, and for their aims, Friday in front of the mayoralty.

The plea for "the unity of France", voiced by the head of state, does not, in his view, preclude the defense of suppressed "minority cultures," in the Nièvre as well as the Basque Country, since, in his speech, he placed both regions on the same footing. While the principle was thus clearly reaffirmed, the reality of the support is less evident: "We have already done much for the Basque language and culture," said, in substance, the head of state, who announced only one new measure, namely, the creation of an inter-university Basque language department.

That is not, however, the sentiment of the abertzale, who cite as a basis the Socialist Party's bills prior to May 1981 to vindicate their demand for a statute for the Basque language and for participation of their "ikastolas" [Basque private schools] in the public service. "We do not seek the survival of the language, but its spread. The head of state has simply announced a catalog," said Mr Jean Harits-Chelar, holder of a Basque chair at the University of Bordeaux, who is pressing for, at the least, the creation of a Bachelor of Arts degree in the Basque language.

The break between the Left and the abertzale has all the earmarks of a definitive rupture. "He has not even given us a stick of barley sugar," asserted Mr Jacques Abeberry, editorialist of the newspaper ENBATA. "The coffee is really too bitter." Some few, within the Basque movement, might be tempted to commit violence. But despite its bitterness, the large majority was prepared, Friday night, to dialogue with the Government. Outside of a conflictual alliance with the socialist Left, there is, for the French Basque "autonomists" no other viable political road.

9238

CSO: 5600/2585

CENTER PARTY MEMBERSHIP AGING, DIMINISHING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "Center Party Leaves Are Yellowing"]


[Text] "A Birch in the Storm"--this painting adorns the cover of "Roots and the Future," a book published by Cultura in 1980 in connection with the Center Party's 60th anniversary. Today the fresh green leaves are yellowing; the soil surrounding the roots of the tree is becoming increasingly barren so that it may suddenly be uprooted in a storm or may slowly wither.

Only about 5 percent of the people would vote for the Center Party today, according to the opinion polls. The party was happy to record a slight gain in last year's county board election, but now the leaves are dropping like never before. In the last 10 years or so, the Center Party has lost more than half of its voters.

To some extent, the loss can be attributed to the fact that the farm population, in which the party is rooted, continues to shrink. Some 100 years ago, about 50 percent of the population were employed in the nation's primary industries. Now the figure is only 7 percent and, of these, almost half have another major source of income.

In spite of this development, the party has done well for a long time. Beginning in 1945, the party has gained support in every election. Toward the end of the fifties, there were almost as many Farmers' Party voters as farmers (see graph). "Based on developments in the industry, the Farmers' Party will reach its zenith before too long," wrote John Dale in the anniversary book. In order to establish roots in cities and densely populated areas the name of the party was changed in 1958/59. Politics were chemically fertilized with the push for decentralization. Both of these changes had given stature to the sister party in Sweden.

And the party continued to grow with the green wave that washed across the land during the late sixties. It was the party of the prime minister for a long time and was able to harvest a record yield in 1973 with 11 percent of the votes after remaining on the sunny side of the EC conflict. But since then there has been practically nothing but bad years, despite the Liberal Party split and, after that, the decline of the Christian People's Party (Kr F).



Graphs show how Center Party managed to expand its voter base in the sixties and become more than a farmers' party.

What then is going wrong for the Center Party? The destructive personal conflicts within the party came to an end a long time ago and there is no disagreement about the party platform. Yet, it seems as if only a broad-based electoral pact can save the Center Party (Sp) from becoming a mini-party in the next Parliament.

An analysis of the political facts provides quite a unique answer: The Center Party tree is now standing in the shade. The party is not as "green" as the Liberal Party, not as Christian as the Christian People's Party and does not generate as much confidence as does the Conservative Party with respect to ownership protection, defense and fighting the bureaucracy. These are all important issues to Center Party voters and many studies show that they in many instances have greater confidence in other parties than in their own. In a post-election poll taken by the Norwegian Opinion Institute (NOI), Center Party was the only party that scored negatively on all five questions asked.

Studies also show that, outside the purely agricultural interests and regional development, voters are rather unsure of what the Center Party stands for. The lack of a distinct profile is reinforced by a lamentable shortage of capable party promoters. In Parliament, Center Party leader Johan Buttedahl is about the only representative people hear from. One of the few party heavyweights, Ole Gabriel Ueland, seldom says anything about what he does on the Finance Committee. From within the radical wing of the party, Ragnhild Harstad and Lars Velsand make fuss from time to time, but this hardly benefits the party.

Deputy parliamentary party leader Anne Enger Lahnstein could be an asset, but she is new and little known. Voters have a great deal of confidence in "J.J.J." and he is respected in the other parties as well for his willingness to cooperate, but he is not a typical promoter. Finn T. Isaksen is probably the most anonymous agricultural minister we have had in many years, and Rakel Surlien has in no way managed to protect the party's government profile. She is an extremely loyal and cooperative cabinet minister, but her lack of perseverance in the Etna/Dokka matter has led many, including stalwart Conservatives, to wonder what the Center is doing in the government when the party is not even willing to fight for such an important environmental issue.

As far as the Center Party is concerned, Etna/Dokka has a symbolic value beyond being the only undeveloped waterway in Eastern Norway. Center Party supporters feel that the part sold butter without getting paid.

"Irritation runs high over the lack of perseverance," one party source told AFTENPOSTEN.

In the rural districts, a deep fear is developing that there has been a reversal of the positive trend with respect to decentralization and regional development. Rural voters feel they must defend their entrenchments, fearing a wave of centralization in terms of renewed authority for the benefit of future-oriented industry.

This criticism concerns the lack of party promotion and not the Center's government participation. There is also every reason to believe that these problems would get worse if the Center Party were to break out of the coalition. Last year's election gain came shortly after the government expansion, while special Christian People's Party promoters seem to have been disbursed as a result of their participation. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that the Center can capture some frustrated Liberal Party voters after Dorum & Co. crosses over to the other side of the fence.

Therefore, the conclusion must be that the Center Party needs to single out a few, but important issues it can solidly support and, furthermore, show that it is wholeheartedly behind and not halfway against the government. But this must be done quickly, before the party trunk is bare and the roots dry up.

(Sources of figures and trends: Statistisk Sentralbyra, Scan-Fact, NOI and Henry Valen.)

8952

CSO: 3639/30

CENTER, CHRISTIAN PARTIES IN CONFLICT OVER ELECTORAL PACT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by Odd Inge Skjavesland: "KrF and Sp: Vying for Advantages of Election Cooperation"]

[Text] Both the Christian People's Party (KrF) and the Center Party (Sp) will be vying for the advantages connected with an essential election cooperation. Sp fears that KrF will benefit the most from an electoral pact. The smallest government party is therefore more anxious to have joint ballots in the individual counties than is KrF. This form of cooperation is being considered in Telemark, Vestfold and Buskerud counties.

The Center Party organization in Telemark wants to coordinate its joint ballot with that of Vestfold county. If the top Sp candidate in Vestfold, Minister of Environmental Affairs Rakel Surlien, is listed first on the Vestfold ballot, Telemark Sp will accept a second-place listing of its candidate.

But the two Vestfold party organizations have agreed to wait and see what happens in Buskerud. In the latter county, Sp parliamentary leader Johan Buttedahl will likely be at the top of the ballot, with Minister of Developmental Aid Reidun Brusletten in second place.

In the joint ballot situation, the candidates of the cooperating parties are listed on the same ballot. For example, if Buttedahl is elected, Brusletten becomes the first deputy representative. In the electoral pact situation, the parties have separate ballots. The party that gets the most votes assumes the votes of the other party (parties). "The loser" forfeits any deputy representation.

According to what AFTENPOSTEN has learned, Telemark KrF will not agree to a joint ballot with Sp in that county under any circumstances. The party has two candidates who are running evenly as the successor to Jorgen Sonstebos: Solveig Solli and Arnfinn Johs. Stein. The Christian People's Party organization in Telemark county does not want to discuss any form of cooperation until after their nominating meeting 24 November and until Parliament has officially approved an electoral pact.

The Christian People's Party now have five of the six mandates in Telemark county. But on the basis of more than 500 fewer Sp votes in 1981, the sixth mandate will be lost as well. Therefore, the party needs the help of other parties to protect this mandate. The Liberal People's Party has approached KrF, but the county party organization is being urged not to enter any agreements except with government parties, as requested by the chairman of the Conservative, Center and Christian People's parties. At the upcoming nominating meeting, Telemark KrF will probably be authorized to negotiate with other parties.

The Christian People's Party organization in Vestfold county is pushing for an electoral pact. The party was approximately 150 votes short of a mandate in 1981. Former parliamentary representative Age Ramberg tops the list again. As county party chairman, he told AFTENPOSTEN that it would be logical to use the electoral pact since both KrF and Sp have fought for it.

In both Vestfold and Telemark counties, the middle parties are afraid to cooperate except with the government parties.

8952

CSO: 3639/30

NEWSPAPERS WARN PALME ABOUT DEPENDING ON COMMUNISTS

Result of SDP Attitude Change

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 Oct 84 p 2

[Commentary by Ola Gummerson: "Pestilence or Cholera: The Choice is Made!"]

[Text] There was a time when the Swedish social democrats really drew the line where their communist opponents were concerned, when leading social democrats were strongly committed to fighting the communists and their ideology.

That was not long ago but it seems like ages. Important changes have taken place in the relations between the social democrats and the communists. The changes have taken place since Tage Erlander's departure as prime minister and Social Democratic Party leader.

The type of more or less organized cooperation between social democrats and communists that we see proof of nowadays, was not conceivable in Erlander's time. When Erlander needed parliamentary support for his policy, he went to the "peasants." When the current government cannot carry through its policy alone--as is well known, we have a minority government--it turns to the communists. This means a significant change of position in Swedish politics.

Heads of our governments like to talk about their desire to effect broad solutions. Our present prime minister is no exception. Broad solutions were his melody, when he returned to power in 1982. Even the Wage Earner Funds were to be introduced as part of the mutual agreements.

This pretty speech has not resulted in any concrete efforts to carry out a unified policy or to reach mutually agreeable solutions. The defense agreement last spring is mostly the exception that proves the rule.

Actually the social democrats are carrying on their own policy without any regard for the rightwing opposition and when necessary they push it through with the help of the communists.

The communists give their support to the social democrats when they have made certain that they can affect government policy. The communists make demands and make sure that their demands are heard. The cooperation at this point has an obviously organized character.

An earlier isolated and often harassed Communist Party is busy gaining a real influence over Swedish policy. In order to stay in power the social democrats cooperate with the communists, who thereby become an ever more natural part of the social democratic government foundation.

With the help of the communists a new property tax will be introduced. With the support of the communists a classic social democratic tax increase policy is accomplished, aimed at the wage-earners.

Leading communists evidently have an overwhelming desire to be part of the fun, even if, for obvious reasons, a dull murmur of dissatisfaction is heard among the party members.

The fact that the new attitude of the social democrats has made it possible for them to come in from the cold, is more important to the communist leaders than the fury of the party members.

The Communist Party, naturally, has a considerably more pleasant political standing nowadays, than when the party was open prey for heavy social democratic "communist killers."

The fact that it lends to the Left and its policy a touch of legitimacy is surely one of the important consequences of the social democratic collaboration with the communists. Naturally, the mighty Social Democratic Party could not imagine a collaboration with a party that is not completely respectable and decent!

Even the political debate, carried on in Sweden, points out, in no uncertain terms, that the choice between "pestilence and cholera"--moderates and communists--nowadays has been made.

The Communist Party is hardly ever the subject of any criticism at all on the part of the social democrats and is not at all treated as any kind of political opposition.

The moderates, however, constitute an enormous threat to the people and sometimes also to the nation. Almost as dangerous are, according to the latest debates, Thorbjorn Falldin and Alf Svensson.

There is total silence about the communists. Hardly even a whisper of criticism can be heard in the political uproar.

This is the result of a dramatic change in attitude on the part of the social democrats towards the communists and also a pat on the back, because the social democrats can continue to rule Sweden with the kind assistance of the Left.

Cooperation's High Price Disclosed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 84 p 2

[Article: "With the Help of the Left Party-Communist"]

[Text] The government came to terms with the communists about support for the gasoline tax. And Lars Werner is bragging about the content of the "secret" letter from Kjell-Olof Feldt. The OSTGOTA CORRESPONDENTEN (m) writes that the government has now learned that cooperation with the Left carries a high price: But the government and the secretary of finance are in trouble as long as they choose to raise taxes instead of cutting government expenses in their efforts to tighten the economy in order to reduce inflation. Raised taxes, of course, have always been the social democratic patent medicine, but in the current parliamentary situation the social democrats are forced to seek support from the communists in order to push tax increases through, and this must be repugnant to them, after all.

New tax increases, however, can never solve the problems of the Swedish economy. They can only be solved by extensive cut-backs.

12339

CSO: 3650/48

BRIEFS

COUNTRY COULD STAY OUT OF WAR--The chief of staff, Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg, believes that a war which could possibly break out in Europe would remain short in duration. Nevertheless, it could be waged with conventional weapons. Klenberg, who spoke Sunday at the national civil defense festival in Hameenlinna, said the short period of time would then result from a shift toward the view that the use of nuclear weapons was untenable for everyone. "It is completely realistic in that kind of war situation that the judiciously planned defense efforts of a small country like Finland will be adequate to prevent our country from becoming the target of attack or to repel an assault," said Klenberg. Vice Admiral Klenberg referred in his speech to general appraisals according to which neither a large-scale nuclear war nor limited nuclear wars appear possible. A European crisis may nonetheless arise in which relations between the superpowers have nearly reached the critical war level. In Klenberg's estimate, also our foreign policy and civil defense must then be able through joint efforts to withstand, among other things, militarily threatening situations and attempts to use our territory as well as political and economic sanctions. According to accounts, the crisis can turn out to be a protracted one, said Vice Admiral Klenberg. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Nov 84 p 10] 12327

CSO: 3617/31

FORESTRY WORKERS FROM EAST BLOC ACCUSED OF ESPIONAGE

Amsterdam DE TELEGRAAF in Dutch 3 Nov 84 p 6

/Article by Arnold Burlage: "Forestry Workers Expelled From Our Country: Espionage on Terschelling"/

/Text/ Terschelling, Saturday--Several times in recent years, forestry workers from East bloc countries have been quietly expelled from our country on suspicion of espionage.

They had worked on lands belonging to the State Forest Administration, often right next to military objects.

On Terschelling, espionage incidents involving the Royal Navy's listening station have occurred three times.

At the end of last year, woodcutters from Czechoslovakia were unmasked after showing an unusual interest in the navy post.

A spokesman for the Royal navy confirmed that, in December 1983, three Yugoslavian and two East German forestry workers on Terschelling were expelled from the country. Officially, "because they did not possess the required papers."

Earlier, at the end of the seventies, Czech woodcutters were also caught spying near the listening post, which is housed in a forestry hut.

Elsewhere As Well

Also in other parts of the country, like on the Veluwe, forestry workers from the East bloc are a continual source of concern and irritation for our intelligence services.

Jan Kuipers, spokesman for the State Forest Administration, on the inexpensive labor from the East bloc: "We have nothing to do with it. We sell standing timber to firms that are responsible for finding their own personnel to cut it. We only set requirements for the manner in which the work is done, among other reasons, in order to prevent the destruction of nature areas." The forestry workers from the East bloc work, for example, for the D. M. Bronk Round Timber Company in Eersel (North Brabant), which acquires the cheap labor from its parent firm, based in Oberjossa in West Germany.

The mayor of Terschelling, Doctorandus E. Haaksman, was not--in his capacity as head of the police--informed about the expulsion of the woodcutters at the end of last year. "It was done without my knowledge. Nor, formally, does anyone have to inform me of such a matter involving foreigners," said Haaksman.

Problems

Since D. M. Bronk is staying at the parent firm in West Germany, we talked with a spokeswoman: "We have, in fact, had problems with some foreign coworkers, because they seemed to be working here without permission. They were in the employ of our firm in West Germany. We did not know that permits for West Germany were not valid within the EEC. That's all. This really has nothing to do with espionage. Apart from that, we were censured this summer for that mistake."

12507

CSO: 3614/30

REPORTED EFFORT TO CONCLUDE PACT WITH ALGERIA

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 8 Nov 84 p 5

/Article by Enrique Montanez: "Spanish and Algerian Military Officers Secretly Studied in a Defense Agreement in Madrid Last September"

/Text/ Algerian and Spanish military officers met secretly in Madrid in September to analyze the possibility of reaching agreement on a military pact in view of the Libyan-Moroccan pact. Certain colonels assigned to the Canary Islands made this proposal to the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of ensuring the security of the islands against a Libyan air attack through the Saharan corridor.

Madrid--A high-ranking Algerian military delegation met in secret in Madrid in September with Spanish military officers at the request of the latter, in order to analyze the possibility of negotiating a Spanish-Algerian military agreement to neutralize the negative effects for both countries of the recently signed Libyan-Moroccan pact, sources close to the negotiations revealed to DIARIO 16.

At the meeting the terms of a mutual defense agreement were analyzed. Apparently, and according to informed sources, the initiative for the meetings originated with a group of military commanders assigned to the Captaincy General of the Canary Islands, who had expressed to the Ministry of Defense their concern over the repercussions which the Libyan-Moroccan agreement could have for the defense of the Canary Islands.

The thesis of the Spanish military strategists is that the defense of the Canary Islands is only possible if they can count on a security zone in the form of the fringe of the Sahara Desert theoretically controlled by Morocco, which is engaged in an irregular war with the guerrillas of the Polisario Front.

Defense of Canary Islands

In the military area the alliance of Morocco with Libya introduces a factor of destabilization in the defense of the Canary Islands, as a high-ranking military commander stated to this newspaper. This is because Libyan aircraft can reach the Atlantic Ocean through this Saharan corridor, which is a kind of "no man's land," and reach the Canary Islands.

A group of colonels assigned to the Canary Islands explained to senior political officials of the Ministry of Defense that the only way of cutting off this threat was to enter into a military agreement with Algeria, in order to enclose the Moroccan section of the Sahara Desert in a pincers between Spain and Algeria. The agreement would reportedly have set up a communications channel through which Spain would receive Algerian information on the movements of the Libyan armed forces.

According to informed sources, the Ministry of Defense gave the green light to high-level contacts between Spanish and Algerian military officers. It was stated that the initiative for the talks came from Algeria, which was more interested than Spain in an agreement to break the isolation in which it has been plunged by the Hassan-Qadhafi agreement.

Algerian Document

At the meeting the Algerian military officers exhibited a copy of a document which they had apparently brought in completed form, containing an offer that Algeria was prepared to make and which may be summarized in the following points: (1) resolving the Spanish-Algerian dispute over natural gas, cancelling the unpaid Spanish balance still due; (2) the purchase from Spain of medium caliber armaments needed for the modernization of the Algerian armed forces; (3) the granting of public works contracts in Algeria to Spain.

After this meeting the Spanish military officers received orders to suspend the contacts with the Algerians, and they were informed that there were very high level indications of a Spanish intention to negotiate a military agreement with King Hassan II.

Trip by Minister of Defense Serra

From that point on, according to a reliable military source, work was begun on the trip of Minister of Defense Narciso Serra to Morocco, which took place last week and included a meeting with the king of Morocco.

Reliable diplomatic sources confirm that Col Abdelhamid Latreche, the previous Algerian ambassador to Spain, was not involved in the abortive initiative, although he was in Algeria, beginning in August, and has not returned to Spain since that time. Ambassador Latreche has been assigned as Algerian ambassador to Czechoslovakia and, according to comments by Madrid diplomatic circles, is in Prague to negotiate the purchase of arms needed by his country from Eastern European sources which Algeria was unable to buy in Spain.

Sources in the Ministry of Defense stated they were unaware of the meeting in Madrid between Algerian and Spanish military officers, although they did not deny that an Algerian military delegation had visited Spain a few weeks ago. In governmental circles on 7 November there was total silence on the matter.

OFFSETS, POLITICAL PROBLEMS DELAY 'LINCE' DECISION

Madrid YA in Spanish 15 Nov 84 p 11

/Article by Fernando Rueda/

/Text/ Political offsets and technical reasons are working against the possibility that the future Spanish tank, known as the Lince, will be built with German technology used in the Leopard tank, as had been thought until a few months ago. Furthermore, to this must be added the statement made on 14 November by Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez that these particular tanks will not be purchased, in order to avoid possible "scandals," since they were to be built by a company related to the Flick Group. In any case, a decision will not be made on this matter until the beginning of 1985, once the evaluations now under way are completed.

The principal reason for German concern in this matter is based on the fact that the competition for the contract is now no longer limited to U.S., French, and German armor, since tanks from Italy, Great Britain, and from another German company have entered the competition. The Ministry of Defense is trying to obtain the best possible conditions for the contract. Therefore, it has ordered the Santa Barbara Company, a Spanish firm, to evaluate exhaustively all of the offers so far received. Out of this review will come a decision on the technology which will be used to build the Spanish tank which will replace the very old M-47 and M-48 tanks now in the Spanish inventory.

Initially, the Ministry of Defense claimed that the Lince would be a Spanish design. However, the foreseeable delay in the time required before delivery led to halting the studies under way for the construction of a Spanish-designed tank. For this reason thought was given to a tank which would be built with the greatest possible participation by Spanish industry. In this way an effort was made to ensure that the prize of 120 billion pesetas which would be spent for the 500 tanks desired by the Spanish Army would have the broadest possible effect on Spanish industry.

According to specialists in these matters, there are several very attractive offers which might interest the army, which is not particularly obsessed by purchasing the Leopard tank. The Leopard has its advantages, but it also has many inconvenient aspects for Spain, a country whose geographic characteristics are different from Germany.

The French are no longer offering the AMX-40 tank for the Lince project, since the Spanish Army has totally rejected it. In this connection it is enough to recall that in the comments which led to the dismissal of Alvarez Zalba, the captain general of Zaragoza, he called the French tank "crap." Now the French are offering the P-48 model, whose specifications are jealously guarded by the manufacturing component of the French Government entity which designed them.

The U.S. M-1 Abrams tank, made by General Dynamics, is a model which has achieved a certain position in the market, but there are two major problems with it. For the moment the Ministry of Defense does not want to buy military equipment from the United States until the deficit in our trade balance is reduced. Furthermore, the Americans are raising many problems in connection with the transfer of certain technology considered essential by Spain.

The other three tanks are presently being evaluated: the British Valiant, the Italian OF-40, and the tank designed by Thyssen Henschel, a German firm.

Among the many factors to be taken into consideration before making a definitive decision is the price of the tanks. The most expensive are the U.S. and German tanks. It is not known at present what percentage of offsets has been offered by each company. However, in the Ministry of Defense there is no doubt that the 120 billion pesetas that will be invested in the program will come back to Spain in the form of investments in Spanish industrial firms.

Whatever the ultimate decision, the first Lince tanks will have to be in the hands of Spanish Army tank specialists by 1990.

To replace the present AMX-30 tanks in the year 2000, Spain is participating in the initial studies of the NATO tank. This is still moving along very slowly. The same countries which are developing the NATO tank are participating in the development of the NATO frigate.

Together with the technical analyses, there is a factor which will be decisive in the selection of technology for the Lince tank: political considerations. This has led to France exerting pressure recently to have the contract awarded to a French firm. French help against ETA terrorism and the elimination of barriers to the entry of Spain into the EEC have been mentioned to the Spanish Government by French representatives.

Recently, German leaders were complaining that the Spanish Government might turn the final decision toward France because of the political assistance which the French are providing Spain. The Germans say they offered this kind of help much earlier.

Another political consideration which is being taken into account is that the country selling the tanks cannot prevent us from using the weapons bought from them in case of a war with a country in the political orbit of the seller.

The story of the purchase of the AMX-30 tanks is more of a factor in this contract than any other. The Sahara was invaded by the Morocco's "green march," and the United States prohibited Spain from using its M-47 tanks in that area. For political reasons no country--including Germany--wanted to sell its tanks to Spain. Only France agreed to sell its AMX-30 tanks at the time.

POORLY CONCEIVED 'INNOVATION CENTERS' IGNORE U.S. EXPERIENCE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 5 Nov 84 pp 66-77

[Excerpts] The original is in California, is called the Silicon Valley and is full of electronics companies. A new generation of "shirt sleeve" entrepreneurs is supposed to provide a German duplicate of California's miracle of innovation. "Technology Parks" are springing up everywhere. Whether this boom makes any sense, however, is questionable.

According to the DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSBLATT the Germans have been bitten by the "Silicon Valley bug." Every local politician, wrote DIE WELT ironically, dreams today of "creating a German Silicon Valley in his district."

From Syke to Stuttgart and from Saarbruecken to Osterburken, state politicians and city councils are hoping for a repeat of the California miracle in the meadow just outside their towns. These projects are operating under such catchy names as "technology park" or "founders center" for which about 50 cities and communities have devised ambitious plans. The first representative one of its kind is the Berlin Innovation and Founders Center, with the bold abbreviation BIG. The Berliners have christened the center "Silicon Wedding" after the working class district of Wedding in northern Berlin in which it is located.

For the time being BIG is at least a magnificent propaganda success. Since its opening in December of last year, Juergen Allesch and Heinz Fiedler of the technology transfer office at the Technical University which is organizing the center have been busy leading delegations from the FRG and abroad through the corridors of BIG.

The real mystery of the birth of these companies is being played out in the darkness of "completely informal and uncomplicated contacts" (Fiedler). This is also made possible by the proximity to the institutes of the Technical University which are located in the same former AEG factory. The young entrepreneur drinking a beer in the cafeteria there even meets a nice master craftsman from the Institute for Machine Tools from time to time who in no time mills for him just the part he needs.

Many people in the BIG fraternity know one another from having studied together, as is the case with the resident robotics professor Guenther Spur. The fact that the company founders are in related fields, manipulation engineering, measurement data acquisition or process control, for example, promotes cooperation.

A former assistant to Spur, for example, along with a colleague is constructing a prototype robot for manufacturing videocassettes. Norbert Schlimm, founder of the firm "RoBer" has experience in the business: For four years he managed the German subsidiary of one of the largest U.S. robot manufacturers, Unimation Inc.

A few meters farther on Rotraud and Walter Kundler are producing their robot which assembles printed circuit boards for the electronics industry. Six such units were already sold even before the opening of BIG.

Engineer Sami Tabbara's firm "Trion," with seven people a large firm for BIG, is carrying on the AEG tradition in the factory. Under contract to AEG, Tabbara and his team are developing electronic controls and indicators for steel works and rolling mills. This group, assures the boss, is simply faster and more flexible than a comparable department within the electronics firm itself.

The lively Berliners (Fiedler: "This is a hobby for us") have stolen the show from some other West German communities. Some of them had the idea earlier, but many of the technology parks still exist only on paper.

The lord mayor of Heidelberg, Reinhold Zundel, for example, considers himself the one who introduced the Silicon Valley to German municipal politics. During the "Heidelberg Promotion," which takes him every year to different parts of the world for the purpose of promoting tourism, he discovered the California miracle as early as 1981. But when he presented his new ideas to his friends in the Rotary Club at home, "they looked at me skeptically as if to say 'what is he up to now?'."

At first neither the chamber of commerce nor the university was interested in Zundel's plans. The Land government of Stuttgart refused to provide the necessary site. Thus, the lord mayor had to wait until August of this year to lay the cornerstone for the building--months after the municipal elections.

The timing was better for Baden-Wuerttemberg's head of government Lothar Spaeth. Even before the Landtag elections in March of 1984 one floor of the "Karlsruhe Technology Factory" had already been renovated and could be shown to the public. The overall concept, however, was still somewhat unclear. "We'll just let the boys get started," said Spaeth jovially.

The technology factory is located in one of the buildings of the Singer sewing machine plant. Singer has moved out of Karlsruhe and the city did not know what to do with the empty plant. Now just under 4000 square meters of space have been readied at a cost of about DM 2.4 million provided by the Landeskreditbank; 16 new companies moved into the building in July. Another 10,000 square meters are waiting to be used.

Baden-Wuerttemberg's pride and joy, however, is to be erected in the Stuttgart Pfaffenwald area. Just the construction alone of this "deluxe model" as it is known in the Ministry of Economics will cost DM 15 million. At the beginning of March 1984 six banks formed an operating company which will make an additional DM 8 million available.

Even the social democrats, often attacked as anti-technology, long ago began following this new trend. North Rhein-Westphalia's minister-president Johannes Rau (SPD) himself viewed the existing parks in the U.S.--like the Triangle Research Park in North Carolina. Among the dying coal mines and steel works of the Ruhr new technologies are now to be tried out in innovation centers.

Even the SPD's left-leaning Oskar Lafontaine, normally rather skeptical about the achievements of our American friends, has also been bitten by the bug. The lord mayor would like to set up a technology center for Saarbruecken for the simple reason that the Saar region has up to now not taken advantage of Bonn's financial backing, as Hartmut Haase, the head of the economics department, emphasizes.

A "race between the technology centers" (Haase) has begun. At the starting line in Baden-Wuerttemberg alone are Mannheim and Freiburg, in addition to Stuttgart, Karlsruhe and Heidelberg. In the north, Syke and Hildesheim are joined by the large cities of Hamburg, Hannover and Bremen with plans for technology parks. Even Munich which Anton Jaumann, the Bavarian minister of economics, has up to now liked to refer to as the unknown Silicon Valley of the FRG is also to get an official founders center.

But whether this all makes sense is in no way certain. Not only those citizens susceptible to the "dangerous spirit of antipathy toward technology" (Chancellor Kohl) are skeptical.

Even Klaus Friebe, head of the Berlin Technology Center of the Association of German Engineers and himself involved in the distribution of government funds, warns that no one should believe "that companies will be founded right where others are going under."

Above all, the hope that a lovely technology park all by itself will solve the unemployment problem in the region is deceiving. Lord Mayor Zundel of Heidelberg thus readily pointed out the 4000 jobs which the city would be lacking by 1990. His planned industrial park, however, could provide employment for 500 to 700 people.

"The new seedlings which will spring up in the technology parks," Saarbruecken's Haase also admits, "cannot make up for what we have lost in large-scale industry."

Also of no help are references to the U.S. where in the 1970's four-fifths of all newly created jobs were in companies which were not yet five years old. These jobs were not even created in the field of high technology but rather in such commercial areas as textiles or herbal teas, homes for the aged or fast food establishments.

Not even six percent of the new jobs which will exist in the U.S. by 1995 will be in technical professions. According to Henry M. Levin and Russel W. Rumberger of Stanford University, forty times more secretaries, cashiers and household help will be needed than computer service technicians, for example.

Fascination with the Silicon Valley apparently distorts the sense of proportion of many of its admirers. The research park at Stanford University was the first and by far the most successful of its kind. But even the Americans have not been able to keep repeating such developments.

Over 150 research and technology parks sprang up in the U.S. following the one at Stanford. But according to the German Institute for Urban Studies in Berlin more than half have failed since then.

Nevertheless, much can be learned from the American example and applied to the FRG. In the artificial, incubator-like atmosphere of a technology center, however, this is hardly possible. "We will just have to ride out this wave," said technology sponsor Friebe, "but perhaps it will at least have the effect of changing attitudes."

Many of the young companies in the Silicon Valley are growing so well only because they were the work of experienced managers and technical experts and not uninitiated newcomers. They brought with them the knowledge and experience gained in large, successful companies.

These particular kinds of "dropouts" are lacking in Germany. The number of salaried employees who in recent years have voluntarily left their secure and well-paid positions at giant Siemens to seek their own fortune at their own risk as entrepreneurs, for example, could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Apparently this attitude is not just a matter of the security considerations of German managers. More than this, it is that the companies themselves have done everything possible to discourage such ventures. There is nearly a paranoid fear at the top management levels of large concerns that such ventures could cause them to lose the leading edge in new developments.

One of the most effective tools for putting someone anxious to found a new company out of commission is German patent law. Precisely this instrument which is supposed to protect new ideas is also very well suited to being an obstacle to undesirable innovators.

Someone who has developed a product with promise and wants to offer it to a large company under license, for example, is "not seldom placed under great pressure," observed Erich Haeussler, director of the German patent office. And whoever wants to make a patented idea into a marketable product on his own initiative must be armed with a lot of money.

Patent fees in the FRG are cheap at a few hundred marks. Patent attorneys, however, which technical experts largely inexperienced in legal matters can scarcely get along without, cost a great deal of money. Expenses quickly

increase five- to ten-fold because truly promising ideas must also be protected in the most important foreign markets.

Smaller firms therefore frequently dispense with patenting their new developments, making it easier to get started but carrying the potential risk of having the new idea be exploited by more powerful competitors.

In view of these and related problems even successful young entrepreneurs like Hans-Juergen Langer doubt whether the cities with all their ambition and all their millions will be able to initiate the new German economic miracle. Langer himself had received financial backing for his electronics firm in Eching, but the bureaucracy had almost done him in.

The young company founder had to wait a long time for the money even though it had been promised. Only with a last minute bank loan was Langer able to rescue his firm from sudden ruin.

The reason for the delayed payment, Langer was told in a tersely worded note, was that they had been "out of disbursement forms."

12552

CSO: 3620/104

WEAKNESSES OF STATE-CONTROLLED INDUSTRIES EXAMINED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 11 Nov 84 p 11

[Article: "Statistical Analyses of Past Nationalization: Weaknesses of French State-Owned Businesses; Relatively Good Results in the Industrial Sector"]

[Text] (G.S.) Paris, 9 Nov--Among the most far-reaching measures adopted following the May 1981 victory of the leftist parties in France was the law passed on February 3, 1982 nationalizing significant areas of the economy, in particular five of the most important industrial concerns (CGE, Thomson, Saint-Gobain, Rhone Poulenc and Pechiney), two financial companies and 39 banks. It cost the state more than 50 billion French francs and increased the weight of public holdings in industry (not including the energy sector) to a total of 27 percent of overall turnover. Over the long term this was at the same time the decisive error due to initial euphoria. It was even more significant than the unwise promoting of growth, the results of which must still be dealt with today by French economic policy.

Dreams of Return to Private Sector

State-owned businesses therefore continue to be a central issue in attacks by the opposition; they dream of returning them to the private sector. While Jacques Chirac would naturally like to denationalize everything--with the exception of the usual public services and monopoly-type situations--in other words, except for the railroads, electrical system (Electricite de France = EdF) and the postal service, practically the entire nationalized sector including the three major banks and Renault which were already nationalized under de Gaulle, Raymond Barre appears more careful in dealing with this area, more pragmatic and more Gaullist. In his most recent major television appearance he spoke about returning only the companies newly nationalized in 1981/1982 to the private sector, above all the banks, whereby even for this sector he would go at a more leisurely pace in view of the possible technical difficulties involved.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the third leading figure in the opposition, favors a substantial return to the private sector but up to now has been completely vague about it without a precisely defined plan. The president of the employers' association (CNPFF), Yvon Gattaz, last Sunday poured additional fuel onto

the fire of the denationalization debate when he expressed happiness about the "denationalization intentions" of the RPR and spoke out in favor of returning the credit sector to private hands. Since the state-owned businesses are also included within the employers' association, Gattaz went rather far out onto the ice with his statement. On the other hand, the furor it caused and the sharp reprimand given him by Finance Minister Beregovoy, for example, shows the problems and even contradictions of representing corporate interests in a semi-nationalized economy.

Economic Value Dependent On Delimitation

For Mitterand and his team the status quo, i.e. a major share of state-owned businesses, is one of the few points of his program which despite all efforts to create a liberal image is not open to discussion. Proof must nevertheless be provided that the earlier decision was well-founded and probably for this reason the Ministry of Industry has published a new report on the public industrial sector based on the definitive figures for 1983, which attempts to paint a completely positive overall picture of the situation. In order to be able to do this, the analytical quality of the report has therefore been unfortunately comprised.

The main emphasis of the report is on the economic value of the state-owned businesses. According to the authors, these businesses--those addressed in the report include Renault, CGE, Saint-Gobain, Thomson, Rhone Poulenc, Pechiney, Sacilor, Usinor, Bull, CdF-Chemie and EMC--made investments of 37 (30) billion French francs in 1983 of which 28 (23.6) billion were actual industrial investments; moreover they have increased their own research funding by 3.6 (6) percent, maintained employment at 990,000 (983,000) and (not including Thomson) increased the calculable balance of trade surplus from 58.3 billion French francs to 71.6 billion. According to the authors of the report, these above-average "accomplishments" as compared to the rest of industry are due not only to branches of industry which have a high degree of public ownership--although this is true--but also not least of all to a "consistent shareholder," in other words the voluntarist policy of the state.

In many ways, however, the selection of the businesses on which these figures and conclusions are based presents a distorted view, because in reality the public-owned industrial sector in France is much larger and comprises among other things the energy sector (Elf-Aquitaine and EdF-GdF, for example), the industrial holdings of the Suez and Paribas financial groups and such companies as Aerospatiale, Matra and SNECMA. Without taking these into account the balance looks substantially less rosy--real growth in production of 0.3 percent in the state-owned sector as opposed to an overall economic increase in industrial production of 0.5 percent. The export quota increased in the state-owned sector by 2.1 percent, but by 2.7 percent overall. Domestic sales also sank by 1.7 percent in the nationalized industries but showed an increase of 0.5 percent for industry overall. And by including EdF the investment increase of the state-owned industrial sector also disappears, while on the average 0.9 percent growth was still recorded. Only in employment do things look somewhat "better"--unless the famous "social treatment" of unemployment is behind it--in that the decrease was only 2.8 percent as opposed to 3.5 percent overall.

In the Red

The profitability of business continues to be weak. In 1983 the figures for the 11 businesses mentioned above improved in terms of combined total losses from -19.2 billion francs to -16.1 billion francs. Without the steel industry, however, the progress would have been much more significant--from -10.9 billion francs to -5.0 billion francs. However, if we look at the broader scope of the public-owned industrial sector, it is soon clear that there was no improvement at all in 1983. With 2.6 percent of sales, the production figure of -20 billion francs corresponds in terms of percentage to that of the year before. Except for the crude oil and natural gas sector and the production of minerals and metals, the profit situation in all branches of the state-owned sector is lower than the average in industry. Without the energy-related industries, production losses in 1983 would have amounted to -3.7 percent of sales as opposed to -3.3 percent the year before.

It looks just about as bad when the 11 state-owned industries are compared with their foreign competitors. The report observes some substantial improvements in those branches of industry in which French firms are active, improvements which compared to the progress shown by Pechiney and Rhone Poulenc appear rather weak and which on the other hand serve in particular to emphasize the crisis within Renault. In addition, state aid to these 11 companies is increasing continuously, from 8 billion francs in 1982 to 12.6 billion in 1983 to about 13.5 billion in 1984. That comes to about 14,000 French francs per capita.

If the public sector is even more broadly defined to include the usual state-run businesses like the postal service and the railroad in addition to industrial concerns, aid (subsidies and increases in share capital) last year already amounted to 43.8 (36.3) billion French francs, according to a report to be submitted to the French president next week, certain parts of which have as usual already been made public. According to this "Rapport Charzat" the degree of "self-financing" in large state-owned businesses such as EdF or SNCF fell from 33 percent in 1981 to 21 percent in 1983, and for competitive state-owned industrial concerns the result was a decrease from 47 percent in 1980 to 21 percent in 1982.

Statistical analyses of the past regarding the adventure of nationalization and of the nationalized sector overall certainly aids in making judgments in many ways. These figures could certainly be made much more understandable, however, without too much effort, and the question remains why this is not done. There are two questions, however, which all the figures can never answer: how the businesses currently within the public sector would have developed if they had not been nationalized and what would have happened to the private businesses operating today if they had not been competing with nationalized competitors.

12552

CSO: 3620/110

TEN LARGEST PRIVATE FIRMS LISTED, ANALYZED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 30 Oct 84 p 19

/Article by Filippos Synetos/

/Text/ The last 5 years have not been the best for big (private) industrial enterprises. Of the 10 biggest firms --on the basis of the size of their working capital and their business profits over the past 5 years-- five showed profits and five losses.

Specifically, Motor Oil, Aluminium of Greece, TITAN Cement, Aigaion and Steel Works showed overall profits of 10.6 billion drachmas. On the other hand, the Hellenic Steel, Greek Shipyards, Chemical Products and Fertilizer Company, Metallurgical Steel Works and Khalkis Cement Works showed overall losses of 5.01 billion drachmas.

The size of the firms and their 5-year profits and losses are shown in the table below. The table was prepared from data collected by SEV /Association of Greek Industrialists/, ICAP /expansion unknown/ and the firms themselves. Other interesting observations are also revealed from the table:

- Overall, during the 1979-1983 5-year period, the business activity of the 10 industry "big" yielded 5,616,752,000 drachmas in profits. Nevertheless, 1982 and 1983 revealed overall losses in comparison with the 3 previous years.

- The firm with the biggest profits (during the 5-year period) was Aluminium of Greece with 7.1 billion drachmas.

- The best year for all 10 firms was 1980 when all of them gained profits. The worst year was 1981 when 7 of the 10 showed losses.

- The year with the best results was 1981 when the amount of the overall profits was 4.1 billion drachmas, while the worst year was 1983 when the overall losses amounted to 3.4 billion drachmas.

- The firm with the biggest losses was Hellenic Steel (1.338 billion drachmas). The losses were incurred in the past 2 years and were due to the exhaustion of capital of the firm. The capital was used in the big investments made (14 billion drachmas).

- Aluminium of Greece showed the best yield in capital. It gained profits of 7.1 billion drachmas with the employment of 23.1 billion drachmas in capital. The yield index was 30.7 percent.

- Eight of the 10 firms operate with equity capital smaller than 50 percent of overall working capital. The firm with the biggest percentage of equity capital was Aluminium of Greece while the firm with the smallest amount was Motor Oil.

Year to year developments were as follows:

- 1979: Nine of the 10 firms showed profits with only Greek Shipyards showing losses. Overall profits were 3.3 billion drachmas.

- 1980: Biggest profits (3.9 billion drachmas). Only Steel Works showed a loss (65 million drachmas). Number one in profits, as in 1979, was Aluminium of Greece (1.7 billion drachmas).

- 1981: The best year. All 10 showed profits. Maximum profits of 4.1 billion drachmas. Number one in profits was Aluminium of Greece once again (1.2 billion drachmas).

- 1982: The beginning of the drop. Seven of the 10 firms showed losses. Overall, the 10 firms showed losses of 2.3 billion drachmas. First place in profits was TITAN Cement (520 million drachmas) while first place in losses was Chemical Products and Fertilizer Company (810 million drachmas).

- 1983: Losses are greater but fewer firms experience losses. Six of the 10 experience losses that overall amount to 3.4 billion drachmas. Number one in profits is Aluminium of Greece (3.1 billion drachmas) while number one in losses is Chemical Products and Fertilizer Company (2 billion drachmas).

Overall, the ten big firms employ 157.3 billion drachmas of working capital while the total of equity capital of these firms comes to 49 billion drachmas that constitute 31.2 percent of the total working capital.

The 10 Biggest Industries in the 5-Year Period 1979-1983

Α/Α	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΙΣ	1.	2. ΣΥΝΟΛΙΚΑ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ	3. ΙΔΙΑ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ	4. ΠΟΣΟΣΤΟ ΙΔΙΩΝ ΚΕΦ.	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	ΣΥΝΟΛΟ
1.	ΜΟΤΟΡ ΟΙΛ	6.	26.512.333	2.295.957	9%	187.784	173.608	275.544	253.673	18.600	911.213
2.	ΑΛΟΥΜΙΝΙΟ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ	7.	23.165.660	14.540.050	62,8%	1.576.640	1.777.730	1.202.040	(603.780)	3.155.760	7.108.390
3.	ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΕΤ. ΧΑΛΥΒΟΣ	8.	15.210.908	2.687.718	13,3%	98.805	33.909	64.126	(309.587)	(1.225.850)	(1.138.997)
4.	ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΝΑΥΠΗΓΕΙΑ	9.	14.969.080	9.610.930	64,4%	(64.385)	569.722	610.153	(664.744)	(1.525.144)	(1.024.398)
5.	ΤΙΤΑΝ Α.Ε.	10.	14.794.462	3.412.756	21,4%	420.000	383.000	647.000	520.000	(19.000)	1.951.000
6.	ΕΑΕ - ΧΗΜ. ΠΡΟΪΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΙΠΑΣΜΑΤΑ	11.	11.270.224	5.791.310	40,1%	432.305	499.486	926.845	(810.247)	(2.051.045)	(1.002.656)
7.	ΜΕΤΑΛΛΟΥΡΓΙΚΗ ΧΑΛΥΨ	1.	11.250.303	4.942.049	34,7%	102.883	150.726	30.398	(41.368)	(270.682)	(28.043)
8.	ΑΙΓΑΙΟΝ Α.Ε.	13.	12.063.792	2.267.487	18,8%	196.025	239.258	148.858	(158.745)	35.141	460.537
9.	ΤΣΙΜΕΝΤΑ ΧΑΛΚΙΔΟΣ	14.	11.373.861	1.771.771	15,6%	143.415	143.746	179.124	(404.386)	(1.589.881)	(1.617.382)
10.	ΧΑΛΥΒΟΥΡΓΙΚΗ	15.	10.776.274	1.697.781	15 %	228.827	(65.537)	17.259	3.111	12.828	196.488
	ΣΥΝΟΛΟ	16.	157.316.880	49.817.889	31,2%	3.332.383	3.985.640	4.151.347	(2.304.873)	(3.428.473)	5.616.782

ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΗ: Τα ποσά αναφέρονται σε χιλιάδες. Τα ποσοστά αναφέρονται σε Capital 17

Key:

1. Company
2. Overall capital
3. Equity capital
4. Percentage of equity capital
5. Total
6. Motor Oil
7. Aluminium of Greece
8. Hellenic Steel
9. Greek Shipyards
10. TITAN Company
11. Chemical Products and Fertilizer
12. Metallurgical Steel
13. Aigaion Company
14. Khalkis Cement Works
15. Steel Works
16. Total
17. Note: amounts given in thousands of drachmas. Losses shown in parentheses.

5671

CSO: 3521/88

MINISTER'S OPTIMISTIC ECONOMIC REPORT COUNTERED

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 12 Nov 84 p 8

/Article by K. Kolmer/

/Excerpt/ - The real GNP will increase by 2 to 2.5 percent this year.

- Agricultural production will increase by 6 to 7 percent, industrial production by 1.5 percent and services by 2 percent.

- This year, inflation will fluctuate around 18-18.5 percent and the public deficit will reach 10.3 percent of the GNP.

- The widening of the balance of payments will not surpass 1.9 billion dollars in 1984.

In short, devout wishes.

The method used by Mr Arsenis in his self-deception is simple: He revised the level of public consumption by 1 percent (compared to the July 1984 forecasts), he increased gross investments by 1.1 percent (compared to February 1984 and a real drop this year) and he anticipated that the foreign balance of goods and services would show a deficit of only 22.2 billion drachmas (1.8 billion dollars) compared to 35.5 billion drachmas that he anticipated at the beginning of the year and 2.2 billion dollars (27.5 billion drachmas) that is anticipated by the end of the year.

Thus, Mr Arsenis managed "with a thousand coersions" to show a rise in the GNP, in expenditures of firm 1970 purchase prices, by 2.2 percent compared to 0.4 percent last year and 0 the year before that. But evidently with the increase of public expenditures, with a decrease in investments and with the downgrading of the real size of the foreign deficit, there cannot be any increase in the GNP. Unless one makes use of the algebra of the Karagiozis /marionette/.

Now, let us see how this increase in the GNP, according to Mr Arsenis, has come about. In 1984, agricultural production increased by 16 percent while stockraising dropped by about 1 percent, industrial production will increase by 1.5-2 percent by the end of the year, while construction will drop by 4 percent and services will increase by 2 percent.

But even if we were to assume that this agricultural product increased by 7 percent in 1984 --that does not appear to us to be exact if we take into consideration the fact that at this time we are making large-scale imports of wheat and also the fact that sugar production is lower this year-- again Mr Arsenis' figures do not appear realistic. This is so because of the following:

- Industrial production, from August on, appears to have decreased. Building construction dropped by 26 percent throughout Greece (August data), while the increase of electric power production by 5 percent is reckoned together with imports from Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. As for the rise in ore production, there are some doubts being raised because both bauxite and fired magnesium production dropped this year.

- As for the services product, if one were to omit the increase in tourism, it is artificially blown up through the tactic of expanding their portion in the GNP from 53 percent in 1981 to 55 percent in 1984, compared to just 49 percent in 1974. Unless the large-scale hirings by the state are considered to create a product.

Finally, but not definitively, by revising last year's GNP figures from 418.3 billion to 417.5 billion this year, Mr Arsenis won another one-third of a point of overall increase.

What do we want with figures anyway if it is evident that the Greek economy is going from bad to worse, when this year the size of investments, for the third straight year in a row, will decrease and be at a level lower than they were in 1975! This says everything: Socialist Greece is living beyond its means with loans --but not unpaid-- and as Mr St. Manos said the day before yesterday, "to the detriment of the revenues of future generations."

5671

CSO: 9521/88

ND OFFICIAL: FOREIGN DEBT LEADS TO BANKRUPTCY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24 Nov 84 p 7

/Text/ In an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies, Mr Miltiadis Evert, deputy from Athens, said the following after the Minister of Finance refused to produce documents relative to the budget:

The government does not respect the Chamber of Deputies. It systematically refuses to produce data that we have repeatedly asked for. At the same time, through means of amazing alchemy, it is attempting to mislead the people with false data. Already, the Statistical Service is raising the number of unemployed to 360,000 while the unemployment increase trend is evident from OAED /Labor Force Employment Organization/ statistics for the month of October. Thus, in October 1981 the figure was 26,000, in October 1983 it was 48,000 and in October 1984 it was 61,000.

We are being led toward bankruptcy. The public debt that was 671 billion drachmas in 1981 will rise to 1.9 billion in 1984, i.e. an 183 percent jump. Foreign borrowing increased by 98 percent. During the 9-month period of 1981 it amounted to 857 million dollars. During the corresponding period of 1984 it was 1.484 million dollars. The ratio of foreign borrowing to the gross domestic product was 25 percent.

Other statistics that prove the economic calamity is the drop in economic activity by 18 percent.

Industrial production is at a level lower than in 1981.

Overdrafts have increased sixfold.

The eight biggest problem companies, that had suffered 4.5 billion drachmas in losses in 1981, suffered 14 billion drachmas in losses at the end of 1983. Their overall liabilities rose from 64 billion in 1981 to 104 billion at the end of 1983.

Their investments, in firm prices, dropped from 82 billion drachmas in 1981 to 77 billion in 1984.

The deficit of the regular 1984 budget will surpass 240 billion drachmas; the petroleum products account 40 billion; public organizations 180 billion; and public investments 200 billion. In other words, the overall deficit will amount to 660 billion drachmas.

ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY EXPERIENCING STRONG GROWTH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Nov 84 p 31

[Article by Ulf Peter Hellstrom: "A New Research Report Shows: The Electronics Industry Is Experiencing Growth"]

[Text] Since the mid-seventies the Norwegian electronics industry has experienced a rise in gross production value and processing value of about 10 percent in constant kroner, while Norwegian industry has been experiencing zero growth for a number of years now.

Electronics for business (and certainly the data processing companies) have shown a dramatic level of growth, while the telecommunications industry has stagnated, and Norwegian production of consumer electronics has collapsed in the wake of the Tandberg failure.

These are two of the major conclusions of the recent prospects analysis entitled "The Norwegian Electronics Industry--Status and Prospects," which the Report Center of the Institute for Business Economics carried out at the request of the Branch Association of the Electronics Industry (EBF). The analysis was performed by researchers outside of the electronics branch who attempted to take a critical look at the branch. The information in the report comes from the industrial statistics of the Central Office of Statistics, as well as a special survey which the Office carried out on the production, export and import of electronics products. In addition, the analysis is based on data about the large, heavy Norwegian production companies which form the backbone of the membership in the EBF.

This limits the generality of the report to a certain extent because the electronics field in Norway also comprises a number of small Norwegian companies as well as the data processing subsidiaries of the large multinationals in Norway, such as IBM Norge [Norway]. The newest part of the report dates from 1982, so that the recent changes in the electronics market, to say nothing of the stock market, are not included to a great extent.

In general, the electronics industry in Norway includes the following three main groups: data processing companies, telecommunications companies and producers of consumer electronics. In reality, software houses of

various types are not included. Among the largest data processing companies which are covered by the report are Norsk Data [Norwegian Data Co] and Tandberg Data through Siemens Norge, while the Elektrisk Bureau [Electric Bureau] and Standard Telefon og Kabelfabrik [Standard Telephone and Cable Factory] predominate among the telecommunications companies. Tandberg Industrier [Industries] A/S [Inc] accounts for, among other things, consumer electronics. The Simrad companies and Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk [Weapons Factory] are also included in the report.

[Figure caption: Electronics for Business (Figure) Are Doing Well Among the Norwegian Electronics Companies, But Consumer Electronics Have Suffered a Decline Since the Failure of Tandberg, Indicates the Prospects Analysis.]

Production

The gross production value of the electronics industry rose by 9.7 percent in the period between 1975 and 1982, in constant kroner. The researchers term this growth rate moderate, but point out at the same time that Norwegian industry [overall] experienced almost zero growth during the same period. The electronics firms' processing value rose by 10.7 percent during this period, so that this value represented 43 percent of the production value in 1982. By comparison, the corresponding figures for Norwegian industry were 27 percent and 35 percent for the engineering industry in 1981.

In both 1975 and 1982 the electronics branch employed just short of 13,000 people. During the same period employment in industry as a whole dropped. In 1981 the investments in capital equipment as a proportion of sales amounted to 5.6 percent, which is somewhat above-average for the engineering industry. R&D are not included in this figure.

Not unexpectedly, the report shows that the small electronics firms have decidedly the fastest growth rates in employment and sales. This is of importance for evaluating the electronics industry overall in this country because most of the firms which are not in the EBF and which therefore are not covered by the study in this regard are smaller firms.

Exports

The special survey done by the Central Office of Statistics shows that during the period 1978-1982 the Norwegian electronics industry experienced significant growth in its exports. The Office's data show an increase of 42 percent, measured in constant kroner, during this period. Here the data processing branch showed a growth rate of 71 percent between 1978 and 1980, but the group excluding business electronics increased a full 95 percent. The exports of the telecommunications industry rose by 37 percent.

It should be noted that, while in 1982 the telecommunications industry was still ahead of the data processing industry in sales, the picture is the opposite as regards exports: here the exports of data processing

equipment are nearly half again as large as those of telecommunications equipment. The researchers estimate the share of exports at 60-70 percent for the data processing industry, while the share in the telecommunications industry is down around 20-30 percent.

This reflects a situation which is probably the same today: while the Norwegian telecommunications industry is dominated by EB and STK, both of which are largely oriented toward the Norwegian domestic market, the data processing industry has concentrated to a great extent on the international market, which is often the only place where the data processing firms can grow. The electronics industry as a whole had an export level of 41 percent in 1982.

The North Sea

The prospects analysis notes that Norwegian electronics firms have built up a solid competitive position in the off-shore market. The trend is toward a steady increase in the use of electronics in connection with off-shore oil production.

It is impossible to ascertain how large the domestic market will be in the coming years. As a point of reference, however, the report states that 220 million kroner worth of electronics are being purchased for Gullfaus' A platform. This includes purely electronic systems such as control and monitoring equipment, telecommunications gear, etc., as well as instrumentation and electronics which go into mechanical equipment. Installation is not included in this figure. The researchers estimate the total value of equipment deliveries to Gullfaus at about 1.4 billion kroner. Sixty percent of the electronics deliveries are coming from Norwegian companies, and this figure is corrected for direct imports to the Norwegian firms.

Gullfaus' A Project had previously been singled out as a pioneer in the use of data processing technology off-shore. The platforms which are later to be built and used in fields such as Troll, Oseberg, Sleipner and Haltenbanken will probably use the new technologies to at least as large an extent.

The oil rate [as published] committee indicates that the total market for investments in the Norwegian shelf will be about 15 billion 1982 kroner per year up till the year 2000, provided that production gradually rises toward 90 million petroleum equivalent tons in 2010. If Gullfaus A is taken as an indication of the [market] share of electronics for the future, we can expect a total investment market of 200-300 million kroner per year, not including installation, predicts the prospects analysis.

Public Indifference

A great deal of space is devoted to the role of the public in the prospects analysis of the electronics industry. The report points out, among other things, that concern over inflation and limits on public expenditures

have had the effect that the political goals of real growth in appropriations for technical and industrial research and development have lagged far behind previous levels. On this and a number of other points, the report contains critical comments regarding the role of the authorities. Among other things, the report proposes that the authorities should work to assist the Norwegian electronics industry by making government purchases of equipment to a much greater extent than heretofore.

The prospects analysis was written before, however, the Government presented its proposed government budget in which a growth package for industry was proposed and where information technology was mentioned as one of the four areas which the authorities want to emphasize in particular in the coming years.

The prospects analysis also calls for complete digitization of the telecommunications system before 1995 and rapid expansion of the remote data processing network, as well as a freer hand for the Televerk [Telecommunications Office] in a market characterized by growing competition. The Televerk's own [growth] rate plan calls (by comparison for having 55 percent of the telephone customers be hooked up to digital exchanges before 1992.

Integrated circuits are in the process of replacing the oil barrel as a symbol of power, and there is heavy competition in technology and industrial policy in the most developed countries to lay the groundwork for new industries, say the researchers, who claim that Norway must, as a nation, take stronger measures starting immediately to ensure that the country continues to develop an electronics industry which is capable of competing on the international market.

Foreign Assessment:

Norsk Data Up

Financial analysts abroad have adjusted upward their forecasts of the before-taxes results [profits] of Norsk Data [Norwegian Data Co] for this year from about 200 million to an estimated 220-230 million kroner. This was revealed by administrative director Rolf Skar at the company offices during the general stockholders' meeting on Saturday. In general, the estimates of sales are on the order of 1.3-1.4 billion kroner, and the forecasts for next year range around 1.8-1.9 billion.

Due to stock exchange regulations both at home and abroad, the head of Norsk Data was not at liberty to state how the data company was faring at the end of the fiscal year; he could only cite the figures with which market observers in New York and other cities are working. These estimates have often been accurate in the past.

Next year Norsk Data is expecting to have a surplus before taxes [gross profit] of approximately 325-350 million kroner, according to many analysts. Approximately 15 percent of the earnings is paid in taxes.

The estimates of per-share earnings for the current year are about 20 kroner, or just below that. Over the last few days the stock exchange rates [prices] have exceeded earnings by a factor of some 18-19.

YOUTH LOSING FIGHT FOR NEW JOBS IN ECONOMY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Nov 84 p 16

[Article by Soren Lofvenhaft: "20-Year-Study of 250 Jobs--Youth Is Losing Fight For New Jobs"]

[Text] Changes in the labor market have affected young people the most. They have lost a considerable share especially in expanding sectors--despite their higher educational training.

This was recently shown by a study of the trends of 250 professional groups over a period of 20 years, which was prepared by Orebro university.

Furthermore, young people tend to concentrate on getting jobs in the sector with unqualified jobs which do not require any training.

This is also where the threat looms largest for them to become unemployed.

"This is a sign of the future we must prevent if unemployment for young people is to be solved," says Rolf Stal, Ph.D.

He and sociologist Olle Bursell together examined how young people, between 16-24 years of age, managed to get by in the increasingly more difficult competition on the open labor market since 1960 until the 1980's.

"It is very clear that the regular labor market--more and more--has cut off young people from jobs. It has become harder and harder for them to gain access to it," says Stal.

Lost Ground

The two researchers established that:

- Young people consistently lost ground in the five sectors of the labor market that expanded during this period of time (see diagram). The only

- exception they found was in the service sector where the 20-24 year-old group increased its share--but this did not apply to younger boys or girls.
- The youngest group--16-19 year-old--show a downward curve in their share of the three declining fields--as well as the unchanged part time labor market. The older group (20-24-years old) have gotten along better in this category but their future prospects are uncertain.

Rolf Stal comments: "If the future means to be in on where there is expansion and not where there is a trend toward recession, then young people will have a rough time in the future on the labor market."

"The really big losers on the open labor market are the young people between 16-19 years of age," he says.

Reduction

In 1960 there were about 300,000 young people in that age-bracket who were gainfully employed. By 1980 that number had been dramatically reduced by more than a half.

"This large exit of youth from the labor market cannot be explained by the fact that they have chosen more education (extended secondary schools) before working. We have good evidence for saying that they--to a large extent--have been forced out," Stal maintains.

What has happened to the young people who remain in the open labor market? Stal and Bursell have made the first Swedish investigation so far to find out where they end up now--compared with earlier.

They have made a detailed survey of Orebro community which includes about 50,000 employees and have also taken a look at the national figures. The picture emerging from the Orebro study and that of the nation as a whole are similar.

When Stal and Bursell were looking for possible changes and shifting features they divided the labor market into different sectors--in accordance with international models.

Sectors

The primary sector includes the "best jobs" which require a solid education and provide security and a good salary.

The secondary sector includes jobs primarily found in the production of goods and services, with lower educational requirements and less advantageous conditions.

The marginal sector covers those jobs where no educational training is required and where the pay and security are worst.

"Despite the fact that the educational level has been raised an increasing number of young people tend to end up in this marginal sector." says Stal.

His extensive research also shows that a worsening labor market increases sex discrimination too. The groups moving into the marginal jobs--in both age groups, 16-19 and 20-24--are mostly made up of girls.

Services

Boys seem to have a more secure place in the primary sector. There is a definite trend that shows a number of young people moving from jobs in the production of goods to the production of services during this period.

The pattern in the Orebro-study agrees with the results obtained by the Center of Statistics (SCB) in their analysis this year. The SCB has made a comparative study of youth employment (16-24-years old) in different occupations in 1980 and ten years ago.

The most common job emerging for girls has been that of a practical nurse. There has been an increase of 18,000 since 1970. Other jobs showing large increases are cleaning-women (an increase of 8,000), kitchen aids (an increase of 5,000) and home aids (an increase of 4,000).

There has been a decline for girls in the office professions (minus 23,000) and 5,000 less work in stores. Boys likewise show the greatest increase in the practical nursing field (3,000 more).


Explosion

Rolf Stal feels that the new youth law was an entirely necessary reform in view of the results produced by the 20-year-study and the explosive increase of youth unemployment since 1980.

It provides four hours of daily employment for almost 40,000 young people 18-19 years of age. The youth law also provides four hours of training each day in some communities--including Orebro.

"If large groups of young people are ever to have a chance to get jobs in the future labor market it is necessary to explore all possibilities for creating new jobs. I believe that we must "make work" out of tasks in society that we are presently not paying for. We ought to be able to do that if we start thinking in a new way and focus on the interest and involvement young people have in different areas," says Rolf Stal.

Where are young people needed today and in the future? What do they themselves have to say about the heavy jobs where their numbers have increased? DAGENS NYHETER will report about the youth in a changing labor market in a series of forthcoming articles.



The diagram shows changes in nine parts of the labor market between 1960-1980. A-curve shows the share in relation to the total labor market. The others show youth groups in relation to the part-time labor market. A = The share of the professional group in relation to the total labor market.

Key:

1. Public health and sick care
2. Social science/liberal education
3. Accounting/office
4. Technology/natural sciences
5. Service jobs
6. Agricultural/forestry/fishing
7. Commercial jobs
8. Production jobs
9. Transportation/communications
10. Years of age

GASUNIE LOSING GROUND IN EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS MARKET

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 7 Nov 84 p 11

/Text/ Amsterdam--The Dutch firm Gasunie expects its portion of the West European natural gas market to drop to roughly 20 percent by 1990. At the moment, Gasunie still has a 27 percent market share, and it was still 41 percent in 1979. These figures were furnished yesterday by the CEO of Gasunie, A. H. Grotens, on the occasion of the international gas exposition Gastech that is being held this week in the Amsterdam Rai.

Gasunie is presently conducting negotiations with foreign buyers (Belgium, Germany, France and Italy) concerning a possible extension of the current export contracts. The goal of these discussions is to arrive at an extension of deliveries, now due to expire in the nineties, for another 10 years. In this way, Gasunie hopes to maintain the level of Dutch gas exports at a "reasonable" level at least for a number of years after the year 2000.

Offering an extra amount of gas for export (100 to 150 billion cubic meters are being considered--editor) has become possible because of a drastic change in the Dutch energy policy, which--until recently--was directed towards saving as much as possible of the Groningen gas for later.

Not only are they offering existing buyers additional gas, but they are also negotiating with a potential new client, Great Britain. The British see the Dutch gas as an alternative to the relatively expensive gas from Norway. And a pipeline that is to be built between the Netherlands and England would make it possible, moreover, for England to start purchasing Russian gas via Gasunie's transport network.

Gasunie director Grotens indicated yesterday that, in course of negotiating with the foreign clients, they are trying to get some compensation for the high degree of flexibility in deliveries that is typical of Dutch natural gas. In addition, they are trying for a new price formula that would couple the price of gas not only to that of fuel oil but also to the price of (more expensive) domestic fuel oil. According to Doctorandus Grotens' projections, it is above all the Soviet Union (29 percent of the West European gas market in 1990 versus 17 percent now) and Algeria as well that are emerging as important gas suppliers for West Europe. The Algerian share will equal that of the Netherlands (20 percent) in 1990.

Aside from the Netherlands, Norway is also currently losing ground in the European gas market, especially to the Soviet Union. According to professor O. Noreng, director of the Norwegian Institute for Energy Policy, both Norway and Algeria, by remaining more or less on the sidelines and not offering any large new quantities of gas at competitive prices, are in danger of losing their influence on the West European market. This could even ultimately lead to these two countries becoming, to an increasing degree, "marginal gas suppliers." The Netherlands' return to the gas export market is of great importance, according to Professor Noreng, given that there are so few offerings being made.

The Norwegian argued for a more active and aggressive role for Norway and Algeria in the European gas export market with respect to the Soviet Union. The potential danger of a price war was acknowledged by Noreng but, in his opinion, the risk is being avoided since the Norwegians and Algerians are presently assuming a wholly secondary position.

12507

CSO: 3614/29

STATOIL CITES ADVANTAGES IN BEING ALLOWED STATFJORD CONTROL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Nov 84 p 32

[Article by Morten Woldsdal: "Statoil Wants Control of All Production"]

[Text] "In view of the international oil market situation, Statoil would be better able to control the Statfjord production if it could take over the operation of the field," according to Statfjord information chief Willy H. Olsen. By having full control of the production, the company feels it would have a better chance of preventing cuts in Norwegian oil prices when the market is depressed.

The company thus brings a new argument into the public debate as to who should operate Statfjord in the future--Mobil or Statoil. However, Olsen said that Statoil has presented this argument before to the authorities.

He told AFTENPOSTEN that production at Statfjord could be stopped in connection with maintenance, for example, in order to adjust the output to the market situation.

"I am not saying that we--as operators--would necessarily alter the maintenance schedule to halt production. However, we would have the option to do this based on market conditions," said Olsen. He added that this year's maintenance stoppage at Statfjord came somewhat earlier than expected. This created some problems with respect to oil sales.

Olsen pointed out that it is difficult to regulate oil production on the Norwegian continental shelf today. "Foreign oil companies produce oil for their own systems. They have no need to sell their oil on the international market and, therefore, do not have to adjust their production according to the markets," he said.

The information chief pointed out that Statfjord crude oil is the most important source of revenue for the company in the future. During the 1980's crude oil will represent 85 percent of Statoil's total oil production.

"In order to get the best possible market price--and thus maximize income--it is very important that Statoil control this important source of revenue," he said.

Statoil feels that control is particularly important as far as Statfjord is concerned. All the oil produced in this field is buoy-loaded into big tankers. This means that the company has very little choice as to loading times and volume, according to Olsen.

He stressed that most of Statoil's crude oil production is sold on long-term contracts. The company plans its sales based on Mobil's projections concerning oil production at Statfjord.

Records Create Problems

"So far, production at Statfjord has greatly exceeded Mobil's projections. When there is an excess of crude oil on the market, it means we must sell even greater amounts of oil on a weak spot market. This creates problems with respect to individual customers, but it also creates problems with respect to the market--Statoil is forced to lower its crude oil prices and this, in turn, lowers standard market prices as well," said Willy Olsen.

He pointed out that it might be all right to have maximum production at Statfjord in the future similar to today's record output.

"If we had control of the operation, however, we could better plan the production. This would also give us better control over oil shipments from Statfjord. Big market surprises would be avoided and we would be better able to meet scheduled delivery dates. If we do not meet these dates it could affect prices," said Willy H. Olsen with Statoil.

8952

CSO: 3639/27

MINISTRY OFFICIAL ATTACKS STATOIL PRICE CUT DECISION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Nov 84 p 32

[Article by Flemming Dahl: "Statoil Severely Criticized"]

[Text] In an address delivered yesterday, Oil and Energy Ministry Undersecretary Arild Rodland severely criticized Statoil for its recent cut in the price of crude oil.

"What happened was completely unacceptable," said Rodland about the method used in cutting the price, which shocked the international oil market.

He contended that Statoil was guilty of lack of judgment with respect to the international reactions that followed and with respect to its responsibility to inform the Government.

"We are now trying to determine the actual course of events," said Rodland, who stressed that Statoil can expect a reaction from the Oil and Energy Ministry when the course of events has been established.

Rodland's harsh words fell during a meeting at the Economic Market Debate Center.

Concerning the question as to whether Statoil would be allowed to use its option to assume control of operations at the North Sea Statfjord field now in the hands of Mobil, Rodland said that the Oil and Energy Ministry's near-term decision would, among other things, be based on two important premises: the ministry feels that Statoil is qualified to handle the task and, moreover, it wants to give continued priority to tying the Norwegian continental shelf activity to the international oil market.

Rodland did not want to predict which of these premises would carry the greater weight or if they might be combined when the ministry makes its decision.

8952

CSO: 3639/27

RESEARCHERS FROM NORDIC COUNTRIES DISCUSS POLAR ACTIVITIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Nov 84 p 52

[Article by Torill Nordeng: "Researchers Want To Cooperate"]

[Text] Nordic polar researchers want more joint research projects and better utilization of each others' expertise.

During an Arctic research conference in Drammen, Norway, Swedish, Danish and Norwegian researchers agreed to work together on Svalbard. They will drill and remove ice cores to analyze their "annual rings." The movement of the ocean currents between Svalbard and Greenland will constitute another Nordic research project.

Some 60 to 70 Nordic researchers attended the polar conference which ended last Wednesday in Drammen. The conference was arranged by the Norwegian General Scientific Research Council (NAVF) and financed by the Nordic Scientific Research Committee.

Birgit Andersen, top NAVF adviser, said the researchers were very much interested in being able to utilize each others' expertise in a responsible and rational manner. As an example, she mentioned the reciprocal use of laboratory equipment. This means that Swedish researchers do not have to purchase costly and advanced equipment already available in another Nordic country.

"Also, in connection with big international research projects, Nordic researchers can make an even greater contribution by banding together as a Nordic unit," she said.

Andersen believes there will be another polar research conference in about a year.

Professor Anders Johnsson, chairman of the National Scientific Research Council's Polar Committee, pointed out that all in attendance at the conference were very positively disposed toward cooperation.

Expanded cooperation relative to oceanographical research in the waters west of Svalbard is particularly important, according to Johnsson.

"By learning more about oceanic behavior and climatic changes, one can calculate what would happen if we started to drill for oil in the polar regions.

"While Norwegians have a great deal of expertise in oceanographical research, Swedes have gained much experience tracing chemicals in the water. This tells us much about the effects of pollution and, above all, where the water flows," he said. Greater cooperation is sought in this area as well.

"Nordic researchers also seek cooperation in the area of satellite data interpretation, but the time has not yet come to launch a joint Nordic weather satellite," said Johnsson.

8952

CSO: 3639/30

SCHOLARS DISCUSS LATEST RESEARCH ON ACID RAIN EFFECTS

Pollution Origins Detailed

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 22 Oct 84 p 7

[Article: "Effects of Acid Rain Already Evident in Finland: 'Urgent Need for Countermeasures'"]

[Text] The effects of acid rain are already evident in both the lakes and forests of Finland. According to researchers, there is an urgent need for action, since the forests in Finland--due to the soil and climate--are considerably more susceptible to pollutants than in Central Europe.

"Maybe West Germany can endure the economic catastrophe caused by acid rain, but Finland can't afford it," says biologist Rauno Tenovuo, a professor at Turku University.

According to Tenovuo, Finland has about 10 years to act if it wants to be spared the same kind of destruction one sees in Central Europe.

"The assumption is, however, that we start immediately to decrease sulfur emissions."

Tenovuo points out that the damage caused by acidic fallout accumulates rapidly once it has begun. In West Germany, for instance, it was estimated just a few years ago that 8 percent of the total forest acreage was harmed by acid rain. The government of the federal republic estimates in its recent report that destruction has increased to 50 percent.

Premonitory Signs Perceptible

Signs of the effects of acidic fallout have already been perceptible for some time in both the forests and lakes of Finland. Tenovuo attributes the death of many fish in southern Finland to acidic fallout.

"Sediment analysis has revealed the diatom algae to have acidity caused by fallout. In Sweden this development began in the 1960s, and now the forests are dying there in many places," says Tenovuo.

"One species of beard moss has already vanished from Finland's forests for the same reason. Certain species of lichen are likewise disappearing from the trunks of trees."

The shortening of the life of pine needles is also a warning sign, according to Tenovuo, as is the disintegration of their wax coating. In several places, the pine trees no longer have primary or terminal shoots, and the tips of needles have turned brown.

"These are still premonitory signs, but you have to learn how to read them. Maybe West Germany can endure the economic catastrophe caused by acid rain, but Finland can't afford it."

Energy Production Pollutes

Sixty percent of Finland's sulfur emissions currently derive from energy production. The burning of leftover lye in the cellulose industry causes roughly 15 percent of the emissions, and the remaining 25 percent comes from other processing, metal and chemical industries.

The situation is similar in other industrialized countries. According to EEC reports, 56 percent of the acid rain in the countries of the European community springs from emissions of heat-generating plants, 28 percent comes from other large-scale industry, 13 percent from small factories and 3 percent from cars.

International Problem

Solving the problems caused by acid rain requires international cooperation, because the fallout spreads over a radius of hundreds of kilometers from the point of origin. It is estimated that approximately two thirds of the fallout in Finland comes from abroad.

The origin of fallout is determined with the help of different models. According to Ministry of Environment bureau chief Alec Estlander, the greatest sulfur fallout comes to Finland from the Soviet Union, Sweden, England, East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

"There are large regional differences here, however. Over half the sulfur fallout in southern and southwestern Finland is of domestic origin, while in the northern parts of Lapland only about 10 percent originates in Finland."

Estlander points out that Finland correspondingly pollutes foreign countries. Roughly two thirds of the emissions are conveyed across the borders, and our sulfur exchange with the Soviet Union, for example, is about even.

Thirty Percent Reduction Not Enough

An international agreement on preventing sulfur fallout has been reached. The 18 signatory states have pledged to reduce their sulfur emissions by 30 percent over the next 10 years.

Researchers consider this amount insufficient, however, and few states have suggested reducing emissions by 50 to 60 percent. Finland's share of Europe's sulfur dioxide emissions is just 1 percent, but our share of our own country's sulfur fallout is far and away the greatest.

Origin of Finland's Annual Sulfur Fallout

Finland	90,000 tons
East Europe	55,000 tons
Soviet Union	50,000 tons
West Europe	40,000 tons
Scandinavia	25,000 tons
	<hr/>
	260,000 tons

Half Originates Domestically

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Oct 84 p 2

[Article by Goran Nordlund, doctor of philosophy, special researcher at the Institute of Meteorology, specializing in the long-range transport of impurities and radioactive substances in the atmosphere:
"Under Half of Finland's Sulfur Is of Domestic Origin"]

[Text] There has been a lot of talk recently about sulfur fallout. Although the basic causes and efforts are not clear to the general public, most people have probably formed a picture of the chain of events which begins with sulfur emissions from industry and energy production and ends with the damage done by acidic fallout to forests and lakes.

A large part of the fallout that affects Finland is of foreign origin. An important question has been raised in the discussion of measures for reducing fallout: how significant is the share of foreign emissions? Measures to limit sulfur emissions must be in correct proportion to the costs and benefits resulting from them. If the foreign share of sulfur fallout is decisive, then the benefits brought about by domestic reduction measures is undeniably small.

If, on the other hand, domestic emissions are the most important, the emphasis falls specifically on national restrictions. This has been recognized both by industry, which first and foremost incurs the expenses of restrictive measures, and by special interest and civic groups, which fight for a cleaner environment. Research results are for this reason interpreted in different ways to support one's own objectives.

Most Is Sulfur

Most of the acidic fallout in Finland is sulfur. Nitrogen fallout is not quite one third of the fallout sum. Information about sulfur fallout in Finland is based for the time being on measurements obtained from several observation points and the results of two comprehensive international projects. One of these is the 1972-1975 OECD-coordinated project Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants (LRTAP), and the other is the ECE-financed Cooperative Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP).

In addition to these two comprehensive international projects, supplementary information can be obtained from national research studies done in various European countries. The computations of air pollutant transport in both the OECD/LRTAP and the ECE/EMEP projects were made primarily by a research group which has worked in association with Norway's institute of meteorology. Although the computations of long-range transport of sulfur pollutants were actually made in Norway, the outcome of studies done elsewhere does not contradict the Norwegians' results.

Results of the OECD/LRTAP project reveal to what degree each country inflicts sulfur fallout on other countries and, correspondingly, in which country the sulfur falling on a certain country originates.

According to this project, the total sulfur fallout in Finland in 1974 was 400,000 tons, of which 100,000 tons was Finland's own share. However, a significant share of the fallout in Finland, 70,000 tons, was such that its origin could not be determined.

All the numerical values I present in this article are obtained by a mathematical/physical computational method; sulfur transport and fallout are determined by using wind and other meteorological data.

Estimates made of Finland's sulfur fallout for 1975 and 1976 deviated somewhat from the 1974 figures; in other words, the total fallout came to 100,000 tons less than the 1974 figure. The uncertain share was also smaller.

Converted into percentages, the above-mentioned fallout figures give a domestic share of 25 percent for 1974 and 33 percent for 1975 and 1976. It must be taken into account, however, that the uncertain share was 16 to 20 percent in different years, and part of it may be domestic.

Tampere's "Square"

Fallout distribution is computed country by country in both the ECE/EMEP and the OECD/LRTAP projects. The fallout values produced by the ECE/EMEP project are presented on the accompanying map as average values per square (in a unit: milligrams of sulfur per square meter a year). The

size of a square is 150 kilometers by 150 kilometers. The illustration--published here with permission of the makers--is obviously the most precise representation so far of Finland's sulfur fallout.

The domestic and foreign shares can be computed as percentages from the numbers on the map. The domestic percentage share is highest in the square which for the most part covers the area between Tampere, Jyvaskyla and Lahti. The domestic share in this square is either 46 or 52 percent, depending on whether the uncertain share is entirely of foreign origin or is distributed between both groups. Those who made the computations themselves think that the uncertain share comes chiefly from abroad.

Analogous percentage figures from other areas reveal that the domestic share of sulfur fallout is about 30 percent on the southern and western coasts, roughly 25 percent in central and southeastern Finland, and generally 20 percent in northern Finland. An exception is the Oulu and Raahe coastal area, where nearly 50 percent of the sulfur fallout originates domestically, according to computations.


Uncertainty Factors

The fallout measurements made in Finland support the computational results with respect to quantities of total fallout. Strictly speaking, we are unable to determine by measurements the total sulfur fallout, i.e., for the time being it is technically impossible to delineate the absorption processes of plants and soil, processes which, for example, are quite significant with regard to sulfur fallout.

Because we cannot tell from fallout measurements where the sulfur fallout originates, we have not been able to prove the correctness of computational results concerning the proportion of domestic and foreign shares. The high values of sulfur content and fallout in densely populated areas, however, show how significant the effect of nearby sources is. For example, sulfur fallout in Tampere is found to be over twice what it is in southern Finland's provincial regions.

The fallout values presented on the map are based on computational results obtained from 1979 to 1980. Those who made the computations have estimated that those years were climatically typical with regard to long-range transport of sulfur. So we should not expect the results to differ very much from those already presented even if the computations are projected over a longer period.

In support of these computations, we can also mention that corresponding figures arrived at elsewhere, mainly in the Soviet Union, give the same type of results.



- Key: (1) Domestic and foreign sulfur fallout in Finland by regions (Milligrams of sulfur per square meter a year)
- (2) Upper figure = domestic share
Lower figure = foreign share
Figure in parentheses = uncertain share
- (3) Square = 150 km by 150 km
According to ECE/EMEP project

However, uncertainty factors also enter into the figures presented here for amounts of sulfur fallout in Finland and into the foreign and domestic shares of those amounts. They derive principally from the fact that we still know fairly little about the speed at which sulfur falls. This particularly concerns fallout which comes down with rain.

By changing the values for the speed at which sulfur falls in the computational method, the proportion of foreign and domestic shares comes out different from what is presented above. It is even thought on the basis of recent studies that the domestic share of Finland's sulfur fallout is slightly smaller than suggested in the foregoing.

Shares Fluctuate

What would the fallout patterns look like if they were presented with regional accuracy greater than the average values for squares 150 kilometers by 150 kilometers? The question can be answered in a preliminary way on the basis of studies done in Finland. There has been research for some time now at the Institute of Meteorology to separate the shares of Finland's sulfur fallout.

It can be stated on the basis of results obtained so far that the domestic share of fallout fluctuates clearly and substantially from one place to the next. This is no surprise. It is evident that in the vicinity of large industrial and energy-producing plants which emit sulfur the domestic share of sulfur fallout is considerably greater than the regional average value indicates. Correspondingly, the greater the distance from domestic source areas, the more dominant the foreign share becomes.

Bearing in mind the percentage figures presented earlier, we can state concisely that except for areas adjacent to large industrial and power plants scarcely half--at most--of the sulfur fallout in Finland is of domestic origin. The domestic share is generally smaller, but it is still a significant addition.

The distribution of fallout into domestic and foreign shares has received a central place in the discussion of Finland's so-called sulfur policy. It would be wrong to neglect our own measures to restrict sulfur emissions, even though the share of domestic emissions is not decisive with respect to the amount of sulfur fallout in Finland.

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CSO: 3617/25

BRIEFS

PROGRESS IN PCB ELIMINATION--The elimination from use of PCB preparations has progressed even faster than the PCB committee suggested, reported Ministry of Environment department head Olli Ojala at a worker health conference in Tampere on Wednesday. The manufacture of chlorophenols has ceased in Finland, so that chlorophenol emissions from sawmills may end next year, assumed Ojala. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 25 Oct 84 p 6] 12327

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